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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued
a modest twenty-three precedential decisions concerning government
contracts in 1996. By comparison, the court decided fifty-seven
government contract cases in 1995, twenty-two in 1994, forty in 1998,
thirty-one in 1992, and twenty-six in 1991. The decisions in 1996
indicate generally that the year primarily was one of consolidation
rather than breaking new ground.
Thirteen of the twenty-three 1996 decisions came to the court on
appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Six decisions
were appeals from the General Services Board of Contract Appeals,
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five of which arose under the Board's recently repealed bid protest
jurisdiction. Three decisions were on appeal from the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, and the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia sent one case. The Federal Circuit affirmed
the decision below in twelve cases, reversed in seven cases, and in four
cases, the court affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part. The Govern-
ment prevailed in nineteen cases, while the court ruled in favor of the
contractor in only three cases. In one case, the contractor prevailed
on the merits, but the court ruled for the Government on the
damages issue. A unanimous panel decided twenty of the twenty-
three 1996 decisions.
This Article presents a summary and analysis of each of the twenty-
three precedential government contract decisions decided by the
Federal Circuit in 1996. Part I addresses those decisions in which
jurisdiction was the central issue. Part II covers the cases concerning
contract formation, mostly bid protest decisions. Part III examines
decisions that turned on issues of contract interpretation, perfor-
mance, or administration. Finally, Part IV discusses cases involving
breach and termination claims.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Definition of Contractor "Claim" Issue Still Persists
To invoke the jurisdiction of either a Board of Contract Appeals
("BCA"), or the United States Court of Federal Claims ("CFC"),' a
government contractor must assert a "claim" that complies with
statutory, regulatory and common law requirements. To be heard in
the Court of Federal Claims, the contractor must bring an action on
a valid Contract Dispute Act ("CDA")2 claim within twelve months of
a contracting officer's final decision.' The CDA states that "[a]ll
claims by a contractor against the Government relating to a contract
shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting officer
for a decision."4
The Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), the regulatory imple-
mentation of the CDA, defines a "claim" as:
1. Effective October 29, 1992, the United States Claims Court was renamed the United
States Court of Federal Claims. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994)). The
authors will use the current name of the court throughout this Article.
2. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994).
3. See id. § 609(a).
4. Id § 605(a).
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[A] written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting
parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a
sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or
other relief arising under or relating to the contract. ... A
voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not
in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be
converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer
... if it is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted
upon in a reasonable time
The definition of what constitutes a "claim" has, in recent years, been
the subject of more wasteful and confusing government contract
litigation than any other aspect of the CDA.6 More than four years of
this protracted litigation resulted from the "in dispute" gloss applied
to the CDA's claim language in Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United
States.' The Federal Circuit in Dawco ruled that the CDA and its
implementing regulations require that a claim arise from a request for
payment that is in dispute.'
The in banc court overruled Dawco, however, in Reflectane, Inc. v.
Dalton.9 Distinguishing between "routine" and "non-routine" requests
for payment, the Federal Circuit in Reflectone held that the FAR "sets
forth the only three requirements of a non-routine 'claim' for money:
that it be (1) a written demand, (2) seeking, as a matter of right, (3)
the payment of money in a sum certain."10 The court in Reflectone
determined that nothing in the FAR suggested that "other written
demands seeking payment of a sum certain as a matter of right, i.e.,
those demands that are not 'routine request[s] for payment,' also
5. 48 C.F.L § 33.201 (1996).
6. Congress ultimately resolved two vexing problems. One involved the certification
requirement of the CDA after the Federal Circuit's decision in United States v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which held that a contracting officer is not obliged to make
a final decision on any claim exceeding $100,000 that is not certified by the person duly
authorized to bind the contractor with respect to the claim. See41 U.S.C, § 605(c) (6)-(7). The
other problem stemming from Overall Roofing & Construction Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687
(Fed. Cir. 1991), involved the lack of the jurisdiction over appeals from termination for defaults
not associated with monetary claims, see Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, § 907(b)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2)) (expanding CFC's jurisdiction to include "a
dispute concerning termination of a contract, rights in tangible or intangible property,
compliance with cost accounting standards, and other nonmonetary disputes on which a
decision of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of that Act").
7. 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that for claim to be valid, contractor and
agency must "already be in dispute over the amount requested") (emphasis added).
8. See Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
9. 60 F.3d 1572,1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (holding that equitable adjustment was
nonroutine request for payment that did not have to be "in dispute" in order to constitute CDA
claim").
10. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
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must be already in dispute to constitute a 'claim."'' Thus, Reflectone
clarified that non-routine submissions had no "in dispute" require-
ment." Under this new framework, a routine request for payment
must be converted to a CDA claim when it is disputed, while a non-
routine request constitutes a CDA claim when first submitted."8
The court in Reflectone left for later contemplation the resolution of
the parameters of what constitutes a non-routine submission. The
court held that a request for equitable adjustment ("REA") dearly is
an example of a non-routine submission because it is a remedy
invoked only when "unforeseen or unintended circumstances" cause
an increase in contract performance costs. 14  The court used as
examples Government modification of the contract, differing site
conditions, defective or late-delivered government property, and
issuance of a stop work order.5 The court, however, did not
mention claims submitted under the Termination for Convenience
clause." Whether a Termination for Convenience is a routine or
non-routine submission became the central issue on appeal to the
Federal Circuit in James M. Ellett Construction Co. v. United States.'
7
The facts and procedural history of E//ett aptly illustrate how the
Government, through jurisdictional attack, can delay a case for years
before the merits, if ever, are addressed in court. Ellett entered into
a contract with the Forest Service in July 1988 to construct a logging
road.'" On September 30, 1988, the agency terminated the contract
for its convenience because of legislation limiting entry into the area
where Ellett was supposed to construct the road. 9 Ellett sent the
contracting officer a letter dated November 17, 1988, purporting to
"file formal notice of claim pursuant to the CDA of 1978" for an
equitable adjustment, and for unforeseen security costs and lost
profits." The contracting officer responded by letter of December
2, 1988, that FAR Part 49 governs settlement of termination proposals
11. Id at 1576.
12. See id. at 1577.
13. See id. at 1578.
14. See id. at 1577 (citation omitted).
15. See id.
16. See id. (allowing government to terminate a contract for its convenience before
completion of the terms of the contract and providing procedures through which the contractor
and the government's contracting officer may settle payment and termination issues (citing 48
C.F.R. § 52.249.2 (1996))).
17. 93 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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and requests for contract modification, and that Ellett needed to
submit a settlement proposal on Standard Forms 1436 and 1439.21
On March 8, 1989, Ellett submitted a settlement proposal on the
required forms, requesting a net payment of $494,826.22 The parties
thereafter began negotiating a mutually agreeable settlement.23 By
June 25, 1990, Ellett had rejected the agency's settlement offer, the
agency had rejected Ellett's counteroffer, and the contracting officer
issued a document entitled "Contracting Officer's Findings and
Determination."24 In that determination, document, the contracting
officer evaluated the termination settlement proposal and concluded
that Ellett was entitled to termination costs of $416,144.01, less
progress payments the agency had already made, for a net of only
$22,779.01.25
OnJuly 13, 1990, Ellett filed a complaint in the United States Court
of Federal Claims seeking $451,084 plus interest, costs, and attorney
fees.26 The government responded by filing a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Ellett's letter dated
November 17, 1988, did not qualify as a "claim" under the CDA, and
that even if it were a claim, it was not properly certified. 27 The court
dismissed the suit, agreeing that the letter was not properly certi-
fied.28 In an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit reversed,
finding that Ellett's November 17, 1988 claim was properly certi-
fied.29
On remand, the government filed another motion to dismiss,
arguing that Ellett had yet to submit a claim complying with the
CDA.s° The Court of Federal Claims, relying, inter alia, on Dawco,
granted the motion on the basis that there was no pre-existing dispute




24. See id. at 1540-41.
25. See id. at 1541.
26. See id.
27. See id. The CDA requires that every claim in excess of$100,000 be certified by someone
authorized to bind the contractor with respect to the claim. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1994). A
person "duly authorized to bind the contractor with respect" to claims over $100,000 must
.certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data are accurate and complete
to the best of his knowledge and belief, [and] that the amount requested accurately reflects the
contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the government is liable .... " Id.
28. SeeEI!elt, 93 F.3d at 1541 (citingJames M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 90-641
C (Cl. Ct. Feb. 6, 1991), rev'd, 965 F.2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
29. See id. (citingJames M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 91-5071, 1992 WL 82447





Circuit.3 2 Before the Federal Circuit heard the contractor's appeal,
all of the cases on which the Court of Federal Claims had relied in
dismissing Ellett's complaint were overruled by Reflectone.31 The
main issue on appeal before the Federal Circuit was whether the
contractor submitted a proper claim on which the contracting officer
had issued a decision.' The court stated that the critical distinction
in identifying a "claim" after Reflectone was whether the particular
submission was routine or non-routine."5 A "demand for compensa-
tion for unforeseen or unintended circumstances cannot be character-
ized as 'routine."'36 Reflectone had ruled that an equitable adjustment
was "anything but a 'routine request for payment.'"3 7 Examples of
routine requests for payment included "vouchers, invoices, and similar
requests for payment... 'submitted for work done or equipment
delivered by the contractor in accordance with the expected or
scheduled progression of contract performance. ' '
The government attempted to distinguish Reflectone, arguing that
Ellett's termination settlement proposal was a routine submission, and
therefore that Ellett's proposal had to be in dispute when submitted
to constitute a claim. 9 Squarely rejecting this argument, the court
ruled that "it is difficult to conceive of a less routine demand for
payment than one which is submitted when the government termi-
nates a contract for its convenience."4' The court determined that
such a demand, which occurs only in a fraction of government
contracts, is certainly less routine than a request for equitable
adjustment, several of which a contractor might submit on any one
contract.4' Moreover, but for the termination for convenience
clause, the government would breach the contract, and it would be
liable for damages resulting from its action. 2 The parties intended
that Ellett construct the entire logging road, but because of unfore-
seen legislation, the government decided to invoke its right to
terminate the contract.43 The court ruled that Ellett's submission of
32. See id
33. See id. at 1541 n.2.
34. See id. at 1542.
35. See id.
36. See Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
37. I&
38. See Eett, 93 F.3d at 1542 (quoting Ref/ectone, 60 F.3d at 1577).
39. See id. (citing 48 C.F.L § 33.201 (1995); Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1576).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id. (citing G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 423 (Ct. Cl.
1963)).
43. See id. at 1543.
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a demand for compensation under such circumstances "can hardly be
considered routine.""
Satisfied that Ellett's termination settlement proposal qualified as
a CDA "claim," the Federal Circuit next considered whether Ellett had
submitted this claim to the contracting officer for a decision, as
required by the CDA.4 The court clarified that a contractor need
not explicitly request a final decision "'as long as what the contractor
desires by its submissions is a final decision . ".'.."46 The court
recognized that "'a request for a final decision can be implied from
the context of the submission.'"'47 Applying these standards, the
court determined that when Ellett initially submitted its termination
settlement proposal, after the contract had been terminated for
convenience, it was for the purpose of negotiation, not for a
contracting officer's decision.' The parties had contractually agreed
to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.49 If they failed to do so,
the FAR required the contracting officer to issue a final decision, 0
which Ellett could then appeal either to the Court of Federal Claims
or to the agency board.51 Consequently, because Ellett did not
submit its termination settlement proposal to the contracting officer
for a decision, the proposal was not a claim at the time of submission,
even though it met the FAR's definition of a claim.52
Once negotiations reached an impasse, the proposal, by the terms
of the FAR and the contract, was submitted for decision.53 After ten
months of fruitless negotiations, Ellett explicitly requested that the
contracting officer settle its claim.54 This demand was tantamount
to an express request for a contracting officer's decision." Hence,
after the subsequent exchange of offers and counteroffers, the




45. See id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994)).
46. Id. (quoting Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
47. Id. (quoting Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. O'Keefe, 986 F.2d 480, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
48. See id at 1543-44 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 49.001 (1995)).
49. See id. at 1544.
50. See id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 49.103, 49.105(a) (4), 52.249-2(f) (Alternate I)).
51. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2(i).




56. See id. (stating that the fact"(that the termination settlement proposal would ripen into
a claim requiring the contracting officer to issue a unilateral settlement determination was
contemplated by the contract and the FAR").
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The rule fashioned by the court in EMett is that a contractor, seeking
compensation following a termination for convenience, must file a
termination settlement proposal and negotiate with the contracting
officer until an "impasse" is reached, at which time the contractor can
either expressly request a decision, or such request will be inferred
from the circumstances.
5 7
In addition, the court in Ellett determined that a contractor is not
entitled to CDA interest 8 until the termination settlement proposal
"ripens" into a claim.59 The court also ruled that certification of
Ellett's termination settlement proposal was not a subject of the
litigation until after the effective date of the new statute.' ° The
court concluded that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction
over Ellett's termination settlement proposal.'
The court then considered Ellett's November 17, 1988 claim
submission. Ellett argued that it was entitled to CDA interest from
the date it filed these claims.62 The court determined that this
submission met all CDA requirements because it was a non-routine
claim, containing a written demand seeking as a matter of right a sum
certain. The court rejected the government's argument that the
submission failed because it closed with a remark that Ellett would be
pleased to meet with the contracting officer to discuss the adjustment
of the claim . ' The courtconcluded that this statement "is nothing
more than a cordial closing and does not compromise the letter's
status as a claim."'
The government also argued that when it terminates a contract for
convenience, all claims a contractor might have, including equitable
adjustments, are subsumed within the termination settlement
proposal.66 The court rejected this argument, ruling that a contrac-
tor is entitled to file valid requests for equitable adjustment indepen-
dent of a termination settlement proposal after the government
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1545 (citing Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1994) (providing
that contractor is entitled to interest, accrued from the date contracting officer receives claim
until date of payment, on amounts found due to him under claim)).
59. See id.
60. See it. at 1545-46 (citing Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572,
§ 907(a)(2), 106 Star. 4506, 4518 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994)). A
contractor must correct, however, a defective certification before the entry of finaljudgment or
decision. See id (citing 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (6)).
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terminates a contract for convenience. The court noted that "[i]t
does not stand to reason that the government can avoid a statutory
right to interest on a claim by simply terminating the contract for
convenience."' The court reasoned that because the contractor is
not entitled to recover CDA interest on a termination settlement
proposal (before it ripens into a claim), the contractor may, through
a validly filed request for equitable adjustment, recover CDA interest
at least regarding that amount. 9 In short, the court concluded that
the trial court also had jurisdiction over the contractor's request for
equitable adjustment filed before its termination settlement propos-
al.
70
Since the Federal Circuit's issuance of Ellett, decisions in the
contract appeal boards and the Court of Federal Claims have applied
Ellett to termination settlement proposals submitted during the
pendency of a challenge of a default termination. In one such case,
the CFC ruled that, in such an obviously adversarial context, an
"impasse existed between the parties once the contracting officer
received the filing."71 Thus, the submission was immediately a valid
claim for jurisdiction and recovery of interest purposes.
B. Contracting Officer Final Decision-Linchpin ofJurisdiction
As discussed above, not only must a contractor have a valid CDA
claim before it may later invoke the jurisdiction of either a contract
appeal board or the Court of Federal Claims, but the contractor also
must submit the claim to the contracting officer for decision,72 and
the contracting officer must issue a final decision.73 There remain
numerous pitfalls regarding the final decision requirement. The cases
discussed below address whether the context of a contractor's
67. See id. at 1546-47.
68. Id. at 1547.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1548.
71. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 285, 292 (1997); see also Balimoy
Mfg. Co. of Venice, Inc., 96-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 28,605, at 142, 811 (A.S.B.CA Oct. 7, 1996)
(finding that contractor submitted claim for decision by contracting officer when it submitted
demand for termination settlement costs during pendency of its appeal for termination of
default).
72. The CDA states that "[a]ll claims by a contractor against the government relating to a
contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision." 41
U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994).
73. As a prerequisite to establishing jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, a contrac-
tor must bring an action on a valid CDA claim within twelve months of a contracting officer's
final decision. See 41 U.S.C. § 609(a).
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submission may invalidate a purported final decision of a contracting
officer.
74
1. Inclusion offraud ground in termination letter does not invalidate
final decision to terminate for default
In the curious case of Daff v. United States,75 the Federal Circuit
addressed a contractor's challenge to jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims over the contractor's own claims and the government's
counterclaim. 76 The contractor based its jurisdictional challenge on
the theory that the contracting officer's purported final decision
terminating the contract for default was defective because the
contracting officer lacked authority to issue a CDA-type termination
decision based on fraud allegations by the government. 7  The
contractor founded its theory in part on proscriptions in the CDA
forbidding agency heads from settling, compromising, paying or
otherwise adjusting any claim involving fraud,78 and FAR provisions
that remove authority from the contracting officer to settle or decide
fraud claims. 79  The contractor argued that the contracting officer
had improperly terminated the contract because of alleged fraud on
the contractor's part.
80
The argument failed because the contracting officer's termination
letter, though based in part on an allegation of fraud, also "set forth
a ground for the termination that the contracting officer was
authorized to assert, i.e., failure to perform according to the terms of
the contract."" The court then determined that because the Court
of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to hear the contractor's challenge
to the termination for default, it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
government's fraud counterclaims based on 28 U.S.C. sections 1503
and 2508.82 The court also recognized that a contracting officer
74. The CDA envisions two types of final decisions for claims: those in which the
contracting officer actually issues a final decision, and those where the contracting officer fhils
to act within sixty days of receipt of the claim, which the CDA considers to be "deemed denied."
41 U.S.C. § 605(c).
75. 78 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
76. See Daffy. United States, 78 F.Sd 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
77. See id.
78. See id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 605(a)).
79. See id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 33.010 (1984)).
80. See id.
81. Id at 1572. The court declined to "address the question of whether a jurisdictional
defect would have existed if the termination for default letter had asserted fraud, and nothing
more, as the ground for the termination." Id. at 1572 n.9.
82. See id. at 1573. Section 2508 authorizes the Court of Federal Claims to
enter judgment in favor of the United States against a plaintiff in the amount in which
the plaintiff is found to be indebted to the United States as a result of any "set-off,
counterclaim, claim for damages, or other demand [that] is set up on the part of the
1997] 1817
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need not render a final decision for the Court of Federal Claims to
have jurisdiction over the government's assertion of a counterclaim
under the False Claims Act.
88
The contractor next attempted to attack the trial court's finding
that it had defrauded the government by, among other things, using
RA flux when RMA flux was required.84 Regarding the use of RA
flux, the contractor argued that a general provision in the contract
permitted the use of RA flux.8" The court, however, rejected this
argument because a specific contract provision required the use of
RMA flux and "specific contract provisions prevail over general
provisions."" The court found no merit in the contractor's other
challenges to the Court of Federal Claims' factual findings.8"
In addition, the court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims'
dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction over the contractor's claim against the
government for contract inventory in the government's possession.'
The court found that the contractor never submitted the claim to the
contracting officer for a decision.8 9
2. Divestiture of authority of contracting officer to issue a final decision by
28 U.S. C. § 516-identicality of "claims"
Whenever a contractor submits a claim under a specific contract to
the contracting officer after having filed a complaint before the Court
of Federal Claims or a contract appeal board, one weapon in the
government's arsenal is 28 U.S.C. § 516, which gives exclusive control
United States against any plaintiff making claim against the United States in said
court....
,d (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2508 (1994)) (alteration in original). Section 1503 grants the Court
of Federal Claims jurisdiction "'to render judgment upon any setoff or demand by the United
States against any plaintiff in such court.'" I& (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1503).
83. See id. at 1573 n.11 (citing Simko Constr., Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 547-48
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
84. See i&. The contract at issue in Daffinvolved production of TOW Missile Vehicle Power
Conditioners ("TVPCs") for the Army. See id. at 1569. A TOW missile will remain in contact
with its source by means of a wire. See i&. A TVPC is a device that allows a TOW missile to
interface with a vehicle. See id. It must be weatherproof because it is exposed to the elements.
See i&. Flux is a material which is used when constructing TVPC's to clean corrosion and residue
from metal parts. See i& The contract in Daffrequired that Rosin Mildly Activated ("RMA") flux
be used when assembling the TVPCs, rather than Rosin Activated ("RA") flux, because it is
milder and would not corrode the underlying metal. See id. Type RA flux was not to be used
on the type of assembly at issue in Daff, but the contractor used it anyway, leading to the
government's allegation that the contractor had committed fraud. See id. at 1570.
85. See id. at 1573.
86. it at 1574 (citing Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 351 F.2d 972, 980 (Ct. Cl.
1965)).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1574-75.
89. See id. at 1575.
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over a CDA claim in litigation in the CFC to the Department of
Justice.9" An invalid contracting officer's decision may not serve as
the basis for a CDA action.91 If a CDA claim is already in litigation,
the contracting officer lacks authority under 28 U.S.C. § 516 to issue
a final decision.92 Without a valid final decision, the Court of
Federal Claims or contract appeals board lacks jurisdiction under the
CDA over a claim.9"
The Federal Circuit, in Sharman Co. v. United States,94 found that
two claims were the same and, therefore, the Court of Federal Claims
lacked jurisdiction over the latter claim submitted to the contracting
officer while the former claim was already in litigation.95 The court
in Sharman generally held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-520 act to deprive a
contracting officer of authority to decide a CDA claim only if that
same claim, containing the same relief sought based on the same
underlying facts, has already been raised by either party before the
Court of Federal Claims.9" Specifically, the court in Sharman ruled
that a claim is the "same" as a claim in litigation when it "alleges
entitlement to the same money based on the same partial perfor-
mance, only under a different legal label"97 Subsequent case law in
the Court of Federal Claims has distinguished Sharman to determine
that a party may properly add a termination for convenience claim to
a suit after a complaint has been filed challenging a default termina-
tion.9" The rationale is that while the original claim is a challenge
to the government's default termination, the contractor's affirmative
claim for termination of convenience is separate and distinct.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994) (reserving to officers of Department of Justice, under
Attorney General's direction, conduct of all litigation in which United States is party or is
interested).
91. See 41 U.S.C. § 605 (1994).
92. See id.
93. See id. §§ 607, 609.
94. 2 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993), ovemded on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60
F.3d 1572 (Fed Cir. 1995).
95. See Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993), overrded on other
grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed Cir. 1995).
96. See id. at 1571.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. CI. 285,292 (1997) (finding
that termination for convenience cost recovery is distinct from government's claim following
default termination for return of unliquidated progress payments); Cincinnati EIecs. Corp. v.
United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 496, 504 (1994) (holding that termination for convenience claim that
"seeks recovery of money which cannot be had under" earlier filed complaint challenging
default termination was not the "same" claim); Boeing Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 289, 292-
93 (1994) (stating that termination for convenience claim was not the "same" claim "even if [it]
and the complaint [seeking reversal of a termination for default] involve common questions of
law and fact").
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The Federal Circuit, in Case, Inc. v. United States,99 similarly
determined that two claims were not "mirror images" because they did
not involve "precisely" the same money based on the same partial
performance, and thus 28 U.S.C. § 516 did not divest the contracting
officer of authority to issue a final decision on the second claim.10
°
In the first suit,' the contractor challenged the government's
termination for default of a contract to manufacture fire resistant
coveralls and the government's demand for the return of unliquidated
progress payments by asserting in its complaint that the delivery
schedule was unreasonable and that it had been waived. 1 2 While
Case I was pending, the contractor filed a separate suit challenging
the contracting officer's deemed denial of the contractor's claim
based on alleged defective specifications and overly strict government
inspection.0 3 The claim sought an equitable adjustment, over and
above the progress payments at issue in Case , and lost profits. °4
After the trial court dismissed Case Ion the government's motion
for summary judgment, the government argued that the court had no
jurisdiction over the contractor's claim in Case ff because Case I had
put "in litigation" the contractor's allegations of defective specifica-
tions, and thus had divested the contracting officer of authority to
issue a final decision on the claim in Case f.lo5 The trial court
rejected the government's argument, but nevertheless dismissed Case
f as "moot," finding that the contractor's claim for an equitable
adjustment based on defective specifications had been denied when
the court dismissed Case L1° On appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court's assertion ofjurisdiction over Case H and its
subsequent dismissal. 7
Distinguishing Sharman, the court agreed with the trial court that
the claims in Case land Case llwere not "mirror images" because they
99. 88 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
100. See Case, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Case
II].
101. See Case, Inc. v. United States, 25 CL. Ct. 379 (1992) [hereinafter Case 1].
102. See Case ff, 88 F.3d at 1006.
103. See id. The contractor submitted the claim to the contracting officer after filing its
complaint in Case I, and filed the complaint in Casellafter the contracting officer failed to issue
a final decision on the claim. See idL at 1006-07.
104. See id. at 1006. The complaint in Case I challenged the government's demand for the
return of unliquidated progress payments in the principal amount of approximately $2.8 million.
The claim at issue in Case ff requested an equitable adjustment and lost profits totaling more
than $1.8 million. See id. at 1006-07.
105. See id. at 1008.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1011-12. The court noted that it read the trial court's dismissal of Case II as
"moot" as holding that the claim presented in Case Hwas barred by the doctrine of resjudicata.
See id. at 1008.
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sought different amounts of money and were based on different legal
theories."' 8 The court stated, moreover, that a "claim," as used in
the CDA, refers to "each claim under the CDA for money that is one
part of a divisible case.""0 9 The court further emphasized that just
because both cases "arose out of the same underlying facts and
involved allegations of defective specifications does not alter the fact
that the two cases involved different claims."" 0 Thus, Case I did not
place the contractor's claim in Case I "in litigation" for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 516, and the trial court properly asserted jurisdiction over
the denied claim."'
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Court of Federal Claims'
dismissal of Case 1! as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because
the claim was subject to the same accord and satisfaction that was fully
adjudicated in Case .111 In upholding the termination for default
in Case I, the trial court found that the contractor had entered into
a contract modification with the government that stated that the
contractor's delinquency in performance was inexcusable."
Although the contractor's challenge to the default termination was
based on an allegedly unreasonable and waived schedule, the trial
court adjudicated the issue of allegedly defective specifications by
finding that the parties had addressed the issue through the contract
modification, and thus Case's claim was barred by the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction." 4 The Federal Circuit noted that Case had
not appealed this ruling, and agreed that the "not excusable"
language in the contract modification was sufficiently broad to
encompass an excuse based on defective specifications.11 The
court, therefore, affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' ruling that the
claim in Case Hwas barred by resjudicata because it was subject to the
same accord and satisfaction that was fully adjudicated in Case L" 6
108. See id. at 1010-11; see also supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
109. 1& at 1010 (citingJoseph Morton Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
110. I&
111. See i- at 1011. In so ruling, the court stated that "we are mindful of the admonition
... that the statutory scheme granting the Department ofJustice exclusive and plenary power
to supervise and conduct all litigation to which the United States is a party is 'broadly inclusive'
and, as such, 'must be narrowly construed.'" Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
534 F.2d 889, 901 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
112. See . at 1011-12.
113. See id. at 1011.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1011-12.
116. See id. at 1012. The Federal Circuit explained that a claim is discharged by the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction when "'some performance different from that which was claimed as
due is rendered and such substituted performance is accepted by the claimant as full satisfaction
of his claim.'" Id at 1011 n.7 (quoting Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d
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Case if offers both a word of encouragement and of warning to a
contractor who is considering filing multiple suits arising under the
same contract. On the one hand, Case i represents the Federal
Circuit's continuing refusal to apply Sharman strictly against a
contractor when determining whether two claims are "mirror images."
This further weakens the government's ability to use 28 U.S.C. § 516
as a bluntjurisdictional weapon. Case H also shows, however; thatjust
because a later-filed claim is not sufficiently identical to a previous
claim so as to prevent a trial court from exercising jurisdiction over
the later claim does not mean that all jurisdictional obstacles have
been hurdled. A contractor must remain aware of the multitude of
jurisdictional requirements and pitfalls when filing multiple com-
plaints based on the same contract.
3. Timeliness of appeal from a contracting officer's final decision
The CDA contains two separate periods for contractor appeals from
adverse decisions of contracting officers. The CDA prescribes a
ninety-day limitation period for appealing to agency contract appeal
boards,117 and a one-year limitation period for the Court of Federal
Claims.' The CDA requires that a contracting officer, when
issuing a final decision, "shall inform the contractor of his rights.""9
The FAR requires a contracting officer to insert language "substan-
tially" similar to language provided in the regulation in a decision on
a claim implementing this requirement 120 When notice is properly
1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
117. See41 U.S.C. § 606 (1994).
118. Seeid. § 609(a)(3).
119. I& § 605(a).
120. See 48 C.F.R. § 33.211(a)(4)(v) (1996).
[T"] he contracting officer shall- ... (4) Prepare a written decision that shall include
a-... (v) Paragraph substantially as follows;
This is the final decision of the Contracting Officer. You may appeal this decision to
the agency board of contract appeals. If you decide to appeal, you must, within 90
days from the date you receive this decision, mail or otherwise furnish written notice
to the agency board of contract appeals and provide a copy to the Contracting Officer
from whose decision this appeal is taken. The notice shall indicate that an appeal is
intended, reference this decision, and identify the contract by number. With regard
to appeals to the agency board of contract appeals, you may, solely at your election,
proceed under the board's small claim procedure for claims of $50,000 or less or its
accelerated procedure for claims of $100,000 or less. Instead of appealing to the
agency board of contract appeals, you may bring an action directly in the United States
Court of Federal Claims (except as provided in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41




given, these statutes of limitations are jurisdictional and cannot be
waived.
121
The Federal Circuit has held that a contracting officer's failure to
insert language substantially similar to the regulation rendered the
decision procedurally defective and ineffective to start the time
running on the applicable statute of limitations. 22 The Federal
Circuit, in Decker & Co. v. West,'" has now clearly added the require-
ment, which had been required by some boards of contract ap-
peals, 124 that a contractor must show that it detrimentally relied on
the omission of such language from the notice of appeal rights."
In Decker, the contracting officer terminated the construction contract
for default on August 3, 1988.126 The decision was a "'pure' default
termination," because it did not contain monetary issues. 127 The
termination decision "advised Decker of his option, to either appeal
to the Board within ninety days, or to the Court of Federal Claims
within one year."121 When the decision was issued, however, the
Court of Federal Claims did not have "jurisdiction over 'pure' default
terminations under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. " 129 The
notice was defective because it advised Decker of appeal lights to the
Court of Federal Claims that the contractor did not have.'3
°
Decker eventually challenged the propriety of the default termina-
tion at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ("ASBCA"), but
not until almost two years after the notice of the termination for
default.'3 ' The government argued that the Board lacked jurisdic-
tion to review the default termination because Decker had not
121. See Cosmic Constr. Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 1389, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
122. See Pathman Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A
contracting officer's final decision that does not give the contractor adequate notice of its appeal
rights is defective and therefore does not trigger the running of the limitations period.").
123. 76 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
124. See, e.g., Renic Gov't Sys., Inc., HUDBCA Nos. 94--147-C7, 94-C-148-C8, 95-1 BCA
1 27,557 (requiring contractor to show it was prejudiced by defect in notice of appeal rights).
125. See Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that Board had
erred by not requiring contractor to show detrimental reliance).
126. See id. at 1577.
127. See id.
128. See i&L (indicating that notice that Decker could appeal to Court of Federal Claims was
erroneous due to lack ofjurisdiction).
129. Id (citing Overall Roofing & Constr. Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir.
1991)). "Congress subsequently amended the Tucker Act to provide for jurisdiction in the
Court of Federal Claims over nonmonetary contract disputes, such as pure default terminations."
Id at 1577 n.3 (citing Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-572,
§ 907(b) (1), 106 Stat. 3921, 4519 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2) (1994))).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1577-78.
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complied with the statutory ninety-day period.12  The Board ruled
that it had jurisdiction because the August 3, 1988 termination notice
incorrectly stated that Decker could appeal to the Court of Federal
Claims; therefore, the notice failed to trigger the ninety-day filing
requirement. 133
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit, where it argued
that Decker must show detrimental reliance on an error in the notice
of appeal rights to avoid a time bar. The Federal Circuit agreed
with the government, ruling that "[t]he Board erred in finding that
incorrect advice of appeal rights prevented the limitation period from
commencing without requiring a showing of detrimental reliance by
Decker."'" The court explained that "[a] contractor in Decker's
position must demonstrate that the fact that it was informed of
non-existent appeal rights, in addition to being told of its true appeal
rights, actually prejudiced its ability to prosecute its timely appeal
before the limitation period will be held not to have begun."" 6 The
court ruled that the record did not address this issue,137 and deter-
mined that although ordinarily it would be appropriate to remand to
the Board in this circumstance, a remand here was unnecessary
because even if Decker showed detrimental reliance and the Board
took jurisdiction, Decker would lose on the merits." 8
The Federal Circuit has since applied Decker in Florida Department of
Insurance v. United States, ruling that a contracting officer's failure
to address the contractor's appeal rights in the termination notice was
harmless.' 4 The party in Florida Department of Insurance failed to
show that it detrimentally relied on this failure, especially because
contemporaneous correspondence from the contracting officer
informed the party of its appeal rights.1 4' In Florida Department of
132. See id. at 1578 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 606 (1994); Cosmic Constr. Co. v. United States, 697
F.2d 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1982)).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1579. The main authority the government relied upon was Philadelphia Regent
Builders, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 569 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
135. Decker, 76 F.3d at 1579.
136. Id. at 1580.
137. See id. (noting that Decker's counsel admitted the absence of any such evidence on
record at oral argument). Decker's counsel, however, suggested that Decker's filing itself, made
a considerable time after the 90-day appeal period, demonstrated reliance. See id.
138. See id.
139. 81 F.3d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
140. See Florida Dep't of Ins. v. United States, 81 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In
lorida Department of Insurance, the party on appeal was the Department of Insurance (for the
State of Florida) which pursued the case in the Court of Federal Claims after the contractor's
surety went bankrupt. See id. at 1096.
141. See id. at 1098.
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Insurance, the court distinguished Kisco Co. v. United States," in
which the Court of Claims had overturned a default termination
because of procedural irregularities.'3 In Kisco, not only had the
termination notice failed to provide the contractor its appeal rights
in the termination notice, but it also "failed to comply with the
contractual cure period and was 'internally confusing' to an extent
that the contractor may not have understood that the notice
constituted a final decision." "
After Decker and Florida Department of Insurance, it is clear that a
contracting officer's failure to include notice of appeal rights in a
termination decision will not stop the clock from running on the
applicable statute of limitations unless the contractor can prove that
it relied on the improper notice." More broadly, these cases
affirm the principle that a procedural error by a contracting officer
in terminating a contract for default can result in the conversion of
the termination into one for the government's convenience if the
contractor can show harm or detrimental reliance. Subsequent case
law should clarify which types of procedural errors must result in
conversion of a default termination into one for the government's
convenience.
II. CONTRACT FORMATION
A. Scope of GSBCA Bid Protest Review
In three reported opinions, the Federal Circuit clarified the proper
standard the General Services Board of Contract Appeals ("GSBCA")
should use when reviewing agency procurement decisions. The
GSBCA's authority to hear bid protests"4 was repealed by the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, effective
August 8, 1996.1' The legal principles set forth in these decisions
142. 610 F.2d 742 (Ct Cl. 1979).
143. See Flrida Dep't of Ins., 81 F.3d at 1098-99.
144. Id. (quoting Kisco Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 742, 752 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
145. See id.; Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
146. GSBCA review of an agency's procurement decision for automatic data processing
equipment was governed by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 ("CICA"), 40 U.S.C.
§ 759(0 (1994) (repealed 1996):
If the board determines that a challenged agency action violates a statute or regulation
or the conditions of any delegation of procurement authority issued pursuant to this
section, the board may suspend, revoke, or revise the procurement authority of the
Administrator or the Administrator's delegation of procurement authority applicable
to the challenged procurement.
I& § 759(0 (5)(B).
147. National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101, 110 Stat. 186, 680
(1996).
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remain important, however, especially for the Court of Federal
Claims, because of Congress' recent expansion of that court's protest
jurisdiction to include all procurement actions." s The principles
laid down by the Federal Circuit in its review of GSBCA protests will
provide contractors valuable guidance regarding the standards that
will emerge in the Court of Federal Claims' review of bid protests.
The main message from these three decisions is that the reviewing
tribunal must give proper deference to an agency's procurement
decisions.
The protests in the three reported opinions involved "best value"
procurements, which accord source selection authorities ("SSA") 49
broad discretion to makejudgmental tradeoffs between cost and other
factors.150 The court announced that the appropriate standard of
review is to determine whether an agency's procurement decision is
grounded in reason.' The Federal Circuit clarified and empha-
sized that when applying the "grounded in reason" standard,
reviewing tribunals must not substitute theirjudgment for that of the
procuring agency officials.
In Widnall v. B3H Corp., 2 the court reversed the GSBCA's grant
of a disappointed bidder's protest of a best value procurement. 5
The court held that the Board went beyond its task of determining
whether the agency's procurement decision was "grounded in
reason." "5 "Once the Board determines that the agency's selection
is so grounded," that court stated, "it then defers to the agency's
decision even if the Board itself might have chosen a different
proposal."55 The court noted that "[e]ven if GSBCA disagrees with
148. SeeAdministrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12, 110 Stat.
3870, 3874-75 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491) [hereinafter ADR Act of 1996].
149. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.601 (1996). Source selection authority refers to the particular
government official in charge of selecting a source. See id.
150. See id. § 15.605(c) (noting that because estimates are not always accurate predictors of
actual costs, "[t]he primary consideration should be which offeror can perform the contract in
a manner most advantageous to the Government").
151. The "grounded in reason" test was used in reviews of GSBCA decisions, and according
to the Federal Circuit's decision in Wtdnall v. B3H Corp., was dictated by the precedent of cases
decided under CICA. See Widnall v. B3H Corp., 75 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
comparable standard for the Court of Federal Claims under the amended Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (b) (1) (1994), presumablywill be whether the agency decision had "a rational basis." See,
e.g., Rogers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 39, 45 (1987) (emphasizing that court's review of agency
decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act standard of whether the decision was
based on relevant factors, lacked a rational basis, or represents a clear error injudgment (citing
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974))).
152. 75 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
153. See Widnall v. B3H Corp., 75 F.3d 1577, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
154. IM at 1580.




the reasonableness of a portion of an agency's justification, it will
accept agency procurement decisions if the remaining agency analysis
can stand on its own." 6
The court also addressed the parties' arguments regarding whether
a recent Federal Circuit decision had changed the "grounded in
reason" standard. 57 The court clearly ruled that in using the words
"reasonable certainty" in Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Bentsen,5 '
it had not created a heightened standard of proof, and it had not
shifted the burden of proof to the government. 59  The court
determined that the record revealed that the SSA in the instant action
gave a reasoned explanation why it selected the higher cost propos-
al."6 Therefore, the Board erred by not following its "clear line of
precedent" that required it to defer to the SSA's reasonable deci-
sion.'6 '
The protest in B3H concerned a best value procurement for
technical support at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. 62  The
solicitation stated that technical, managerial, and cost factors would
be evaluated, respectively, in order of importance.'" The Source
Selection Evaluation Board ("SSEB") evaluated offers from, among
others, LOGTEC, Aries Systems International, Inc., and B311.1
The SSEB judged LOGTEC's offer higher on the technical and
managerial factors, but it was also fifteen percent more expensive
than B3H's offer." The Air Force formed a price/technical
tradeoff working group ("PTTO Group") to evaluate the proposals
further.'" The PTro Group identified one quantified and six non-
quantified discriminators, and determined that B3H's proposal was
less efficient and of lower quality. 7 Relying on this analysis, the
156. Md.
157. See id. at 1584. The Air Force argued, and the court agreed, that the burden of proof
had not been shifted to agencies during protest proceedings. See id
158. 4 F.$d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Lockheed M].
159. See B3H, 75 F.3d at 1584.
160. See id. Yet, rather than deferring to the SSA's explanation, the Board criticized the
weight given to various non-quantified discriminators. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1578-79 (commenting that this contract would be on "indefinite deliv-
ery/indefinite quantity basis").
163. See id. at 1579 (noting that issue was those portions of solicitation reserved for small
businesses).
164. See id. (omitting names of other companies submitting proposals).
165. See id. at 1582 (adding that Aries' offer was 8.8% higher than B3H).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1582-83. The quantified discriminator took into account the risk that the
bidder would require expending additional funds for providing trained personnel that had not
originally been accounted for in the bid. See id. The six non-quantified discriminators took into
account experience with the relevant hardware and software involved, the location of nearby
offices, and the bidder's subcontractor control plan. See id. at 1583.
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SSA selected LOGTEC's offer as the best value to the govern-
ment.16s
At the protest hearing before the Board, the SSA gave extensive
testimony explaining the rationale behind his best value decision."
The SSA determined that B3H's lower ratings in the technical and
managerial categories would lead to unnecessary cost overruns and a
strong likelihood existed that it would actually cost more than the
other proposals, justifying award to the two higher cost proposals.17 0
The Board found no fault with the methodology of the SSA's decision
except for one non-quantified discriminator that the Board found did
not have a rational basis.' The Board disagreed, however, with the
SSA's emphasis on two non-quantified discriminators over the
others.' Despite the SSA's lengthy and detailed testimony, the
Board upheld B3H's protest. 7
On appeal, the court agreed with the Air Force's contention that
the Board committed legal error by applying a standard of review
based on a misinterpretation of the court's opinion in Lockheed iff.74
In that protest, the Board initially refused to accept an agency's
procurement decision based on the lack of a reasoned explanation for
the decision. 5 After the agency formed a working group that
performed a price/technical tradeoff analysis which supported the
agency's initial decision, the Board denied the protest. 76 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's judgment, stating that "a
proposal which is one point better than another but costs millions of
dollars more may be selected if the agency can demonstrate within a
reasonable certainty that the added value of the proposal is worth the
higher price." 77
In B3H, the court found that the Board committed legal error "by
reading into the words 'reasonable certainty' in Lockheed 11 a
168. See id. (noting that SSA also selected Aries).
169. See id. (remarking that SSA's explanation covered forty-three pages of testimony and
explained all seven discriminators).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1584. This factor, whether the offeror had a nearby office already, was
ehminated from the analysis. See id.
172. See id. These factors were the superiority of LOGTEC and Aries in software and data
management experience. See ida
173. See id. (suggesting that Board upheld protest based on its refusal to defer to reasoning
employed by SSA in its choice of LOGTEC and Aries).
174. See id. (citing Lockheed I!, 4 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
175. See id. at 1581 (citing International Business Machs. Corp. and Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., GSBCA Nos. 11359-P, 11362-P, 94-2 B.C.A. 126,782 (1991) [hereinafter Lockheed 1]).
176. See id. (citing Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. v. Department of Treasury, GSBCA Nos.
11776-P, 11777-P, 93-1 B.CA. 25,401 (1992) [hereinafter Lockheed 1/), afftd, 4 F.3d 955 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
177. I& at 1581-82 (quoting Lockheed //, 4 F.3d at 960) (emphasis added).
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requirement that a measure of proof, beyond that found in prece-
dent, is necessary in order to satisfy the grounded in reason test."
178
The Board's higher level of proof "would improperly shift the burden
of proof to the agency... and would allow the Board to substitute its
own judgment for that of an agency .... "'v The court in B3H
insisted that Lockheed HT is consistent with the principle that "the
Board's task upon review of a best value agency procurement is
limited to independently determining if the agency's decision is
grounded in reason."'8° The court stated that if it "wishes to alter
such a longstanding principle, it will do so explicitly with supporting
rationale."'
81
The court further noted that when the Board in B3H questioned
the SSA's emphasis of certain non-quantified discriminators, it
intruded on an analysis that is "exactly the type of decision the SSA
is entrusted to make."'82 The court concluded that the SSA, "using
his independent judgment and consistent with the solicitation's
stipulation that cost was the least important factor," reasonably
determined that LOGTEC's and Aries' proposals were the best value
to the government despite their higher cost" 8t The Board should
have deferred, the court held, to the SSA's reasonable determina-
tion.'8
In Grumman Data Systems Corp. v. Dalton,' the court again af-
firmed that agency best value decisions are entitled to great deference
178. Id. at 1584.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. As further support for the continued validity of the "grounded in reason" test, the
Court also cited Grumman Data System Corp. v. WdnaUK, 15 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Grumman HI], which was decided after Lockheed Ml, as well as several post-Grumman H decisions.
See B3H, 75 F.3d at 1582.
182. B3H, 75 F.3d at 1584 (concluding that because Board does not require assignment of
precise monetary value to each discriminator, agency's judgment in giving weight to particular
discriminator must be given deference).
183. See id. (distinguishing this case from many others where SSA employed identical formula
and was given deference by Board).
184. See id. The court also upheld the Board's dismissal of B311's claim that LOGTECH and
the Air Force had engaged in improper post-solicitation discussions. See id. at 1584-85. The
Board's rules, "which are designed to effectuate the fast-track nature of protest proceedings,"
require that "'a ground of protest be filed no later than 10 working days after the ... ground
is known or should have been known, whichever is earlier.'" Id. at 1585 (quoting 48 C.F.R.
§ 6101.5(b) (3) (ii) (1994)). In order to satisfy its burden of proving timeliness, a protester must
"assert that: (1) he learned of the problem on date X and (2) he filed the protest on date Y,
which is 10 or less working days than date X." Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 6101.5 (b) (3) (ii)). The
court found that, because B3H never stated the date on which it learned of the alleged
improprieties, the Board properly dismissed the protest as untimely. See id.
185. 88 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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and must be upheld when they are "grounded in reason."'1 6 The
court rejected the protester's contention that the Federal Circuit's
decision in Lockheed I placed a higher standard of proof on the
agency to justify its procurement decision. 8  The court upheld the
Board's determination that the SSA's decision to select the high
technical low cost bidder was "grounded in reason.""" Grumman
alleged that the Navy's award on a best value basis of a computer
contract to another bidder, Intergraph, was unreasonable in that it
ignored the recommendations of one of the selection authorities.8 9
The solicitation provided that the agency would balance technical and
cost factors to determine the best value to the agency.' 9° The
solicitation required a SSEB and a Source Selection Advisory Council
("SSAC") to consider the submitted proposals and to make recom-
mendations to the SSA, who had final selection authority19' The
SSEB concluded that Intergraph's proposal offered the highest
technical merit at the lowest price.' 92
The SSAC formed an Impact Analysis Working Group ("IAWG") to
evaluate technical differences among the proposals. 93  The IAWG
identified sixteen quantified and non-quantified discriminators."
After analyzing only four quantified discriminators, the IAWG
concluded that Grumman's proposal would save the agency almost
$100 million over the life of the contract.'95 The SSAC rejected
both the initial and a follow-up IAWG report, giving detailed reasons
for its belief that the IAWG quantified value determinations were not
sufficiently compelling, and concluded that the claimed savings
suggested by the IAWG report would not materialize.'96
186. See Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.d 990, 995-96 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This
premise must be followed even if the Board would have selected an alternative proposal. See id.
at 996.
187. See id. at 995 (citing B3H, 75 F.3d at 1577; Lockheed I, 4 F.3d at 958-59).
188. Id at 996 (rejecting Grumman's argument that SSA's decision was unlawful).
189. See id. at 995-96 (ruling that rejection of recommendations as "not sufficiently
comprehensive" was allowable).
190. See id. at 993. The solicitation also set forth 4000 minimum mandatory requirements
("MMRs-). See i
191. See id. Four companies, including Grumman and Intergraph, responded to the
solicitation. See id.
192. See id. (noting that Grumman ranked third in technical merit and second in price).
193. See id. (emphasizing that solicitation did not require SSEB to perform this task).
194. See id.
195. See i& at 994 (observing that further study by IAWG indicated savings between $98
million and $242 million).
196. See id. (remarking that SSAC gave four specific reasons for this rejection: (1) for the
equipment of each offeror, only one operator completed the model exercise; (2) IAWG and
OCBD each used different software versions for its analysis; (3) the relative simplicity of the task
completed for IAWG process study resulted in less comprehensive offeror differentiation; and
(4) for two discriminators, IAWG's process study "exercised" application representing one-third
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The SSAC recommended to the SSA that Intergraph's proposal
offered the best value." 7 The SSA studied the recommendation of
the SSEB, examined the analyses offered by IAWG and SSAC, and
selected Intergraph.1 3 The SSA was not reasonably convinced that
the IAWG study could reliably project the claimed dollar savings of
Grumman's proposal for two reasons: first, because it was not
"sufficiently comprehensive" in that only one software application was
analyzed and only one simple task performed; and second, because
the basis for the "entire quantification process study," the number of
keystrokes, could be affected by numerous variables." The Board
rejected Grumman's protest, reasoning that the SSA's selection of
Intergraph as the high technical low cost bidder was "a decision well
within his authority to make," and that Grumman had failed to carry
its burden to show that the best value decision was wrong."°°
On appeal, the Federal Circuit cited Lockheed Iff and B3H for the
standard of review that boards and courts must apply to an agency's
best value procurement decision."°' Not only did the court again
proclaim the highly deferential "grounded-in-reason" test, but the
court again rejected a protester's contention that Lockheed ll's
"reasonable certainty" language placed the burden of proof on the
agency to justify its decision.202 The court also rejected Gnumman's
contention that the SSA erred by rejecting the best quantifiable
information available to him that counseled for a best value deci-
sion.0 3 Instead, the court held that the SSA was not required to
accept the best value information when the SSA reasonably concludes,
as he did here, that that information was "not sufficiently comprehen-
sive."2 4  The Board thus properly deferred to an agency decision
that was grounded in reason.
Finally, in TRW, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 03 the Federal Circuit, follow-
ing its earlier decision in Widnall v. B3H Corp.,2 6 reiterated the
"grounded-in-reason" standard. °7 The court emphasized that, in
of total workload referenced in the solicitation).
197. See i / (noting thatwhile both Intergraph and Grumman had high technical evaluations,
Intergraph's price was much lower).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 995.
201. See id. at 995-96.
202. See id. at 996 & n.3.
203. See id. at 996.
204. Id
205. 98 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
206. 75 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
207. See TRW, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 98 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Widnall
v. B3H Corp., 75 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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determining under the Competition in Contracting Act whether an
agency's decision violates a statute, regulation, "or the conditions of
any delegation of procurement authority," the Board may overturn an
agency's decision only if it is wholly without reason. ° Such a
determination, the court said, is the same as finding that a decision
is arbitrary or capricious in traditional administrative procedure
terms.2°  In TRW, the court found that the Board gave only passing
weight to the SSA's report and overturned the award on the basis of
relatively minor contradictions in the SSA's trial testimony.210 The
court concluded that the record, which contained an "explication of
the exhaustive administrative review process," established that the
agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, but was grounded
in reason.
2 11
B. Award of Bid Preparation Costs in the Court of Federal Claims: The
Government's Duty to Conduct a Fair Procurement
In the seminal decision of Heyer Products Co. v. United States,212 the
Court of Claims ruled that disappointed bidders have standing to
bring claims for recovery of their bid preparation costs in the Court
of Federal Claims.213 Such claims are based on the theory that an
implied contract214 arises from the government procurement process
which imposes upon the government a duty to consider all bids fairly
and honestly, the breach of which entitles an unsuccessful bidder to
recover its bid preparation costs.21 5  To prove such a breach, the
protester bears the heavy burden of proving that the government's
conduct was arbitrary and capricious.216
208. See id. at 1327 (citing B3H, 75 F.3d at 1580).
209. See id. at 1328.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
213. See Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 413-14 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
214. The Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over "any claim against
the United States founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United
States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994).
215. See Heyer Prods., 140 F. Supp. at 409; see also National Forge Co. v. United States, 779
F.2d 665, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1985); United States v.John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Ct. Cl. 1974). No specific
statutory authority existed for any court to consider contract award controversies, however, until
Congress granted equitable powers to the United States Claims Court, see Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 ("FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 37-38 (pertinent
section codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (3)), which was interpreted to apply only to pre-award
controversies. SeeJohn C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d at 1372 ("[T]he statute and its legislative history
leave no doubt that Congress intended the equitable power of the Claims Court to be exercised
only before an award is made ... ."). But see infra note 244 and accompanying text.
216. See, eg, CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Keco
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1237 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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In Keco Industry, Inc. v. United States,217 the Court of Claims set out
four criteria to determine whether the government acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in its source selection: (1) the existence of subjective
bad faith by the procuring officials; (2) the reasonableness of the
agency's decision; (3) the amount of discretion statutorily prescribed
to the procurement officials; and (4) the violation of pertinent
statutes or regulations. 21' The application of these criteria depends
on the nature of the alleged error and whether the error occurred
regarding the claimant's or a competitor's bid.
219
Subsequent to those cases for recovery of bid and proposal costs,
Congress gave the Claims Court authority to grant injunctive relief in
pre-award bid protests based on the implied contract to consider all
bids fairly and honestly.22° The ADR Act of 1996 repealed and
replaced this with broader and more straightforward authority to
review and enjoin procurement decisions under the APA standard of
review.221 Despite this expansion of bid protest authority, Keco's
rationale, based as it is on an implied contract theory, remains in
effect as an alternative approach to recovering bid and proposal costs.
In E.W Bliss Co. v. United States,222 the Federal Circuit upheld the
Court of Federal Claims' grant of summary judgment denying an
unsuccessful bidder's claim for the recovery of its bid preparation
costs.22 The court determined that Bliss failed to prove, even
assuming that the contract was awarded in violation of procurement
regulations, that the government's procurement decision was arbitrary
and capricious under the Keco standard.224  Thus, Bliss was not
entitled to recover its bid preparation costs.2' Bliss unsuccessfully
bid on a best-value contract to refurbish and remanufacture the
United States Mint's coin presses.2
217. 492 F.2d 1200 (CL C1. 1974).
218. See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
219. See id. at 1204.
220. See FCIA, § 127(a). The FCIA also divided the Court of Claims into a separate trial
court, the United States Claims Court, and an appellate court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
221. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1994),
repealed by ADR Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a) (2), 110 Stat. 3874.
222. 77 F.3d 445 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
223. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 446 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Also, the court
held that the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in denying Bliss' motion to
amend its complaint "almost seven months after Bliss had moved for summaryjudgment and
at a time when decision on that motion was imminent." Id. at 450.
224. See id. at 449.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 446.
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An amendment to the solicitation instructed bidders to "address a
new crankshaft."2" Bliss' suit for bid preparation costs alleged, inter
alia, that the award was unreasonable because it was based on an
ambiguous amendment, and, alternatively, that the successful bidder's
proposal did not meet the requirements of an unambiguous amend-
ment because it did not include the installation of a new crankshaft,
thus violating procurement statutes.228 The trial court found that
(1) the Mint reasonably construed the amendment as requiring
installation of a new crankshaft, (2) Bliss' proposal specifically so
provided, (3) the successful bidder's proposal stated that it would
"evaluate" all parts for replacement, and only referred to the
crankshaft in an "options" section, and (4) the Mint construed the
successful bidder's proposal as implicitly providing for a new crank-
shaft l The trial court concluded that while the procurement
process was not totally free from errors, Bliss had failed to prove that
the award was arbitrary or capricious, and thus was not entitled to
recover its bid preparation costs.
23 °
On appeal, the court first rejected the trial court's conclusion that
the amendment was ambiguous.23' Read in the context of the
entire solicitation, the court concluded that the amendment unambig-
uously required the installation of a new crankshaft2 2  The court
also rejected Bliss' contention that the Mint's award of the contract
to a bidder whose proposal did not conform to the unambiguous
amendment entitled Bliss to recovery of its bid preparation costs.33
Although a contract award based on a proposal that fails to
conform to the material terms and conditions of a solicitation violates
procurement statutes and regulations, such a violation does not
necessarily constitute arbitrary and capricious action under KecoA3
4
227. Id
228. See id. at 448.
229. SeeE.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 123 (1995), aff'd, 77 F.3d 445 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Bliss initially filed a post-award protest with the Comptroller General, which was denied.
SeeE.W. Bliss, 77 F.3d at 446.
230. See E.W. Biss, 77 F.3d at 446-47. Specifically, the trial court found that although the
solicitation amendment was ambiguous, because the Mint could reasonably construe the
successful bidder's proposal as providing for a new crankshaft, the ambiguity did not make the
award arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 447. Moreover, even if the successful proposal did not
meet the crankshaft requirement, Bliss failed to meet the heavy burden placed on it by the
arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.
231. See id. at 448.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. ("[I]t may be that even a proven violation of some procurement regulation, in
selecting the competitor, will not necessarily make a good claim. Not every regulation is
established for the benefit of bidders as a class, and still fewer may create enforceable rights for
the awardee's competitors." (citing Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Ct.
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The court held that Bliss failed to meet even its initial burden of
proving that the successful bidder's proposal was nonconforming. 35
Furthermore, the court determined that Bliss failed to show that
the award was arbitrary and capricious under the Keco criteria.2"
Bliss did not even allege bad faith by the government.2 7 Bliss also
failed to show that the provision of new crankshafts was of such
significance that the Mint's award decision had "no reasonable
basis."
23
Finally, the court affirmed the rule that the decisions of procure-
ment officials in awarding best-value contracts are given great
deference on review.239 The court concluded that Bliss failed to
show that the Mint's procurement decision was arbitrary and
capricious, and thus Bliss was not entitled to recover its bid prepara-
tion costs.
24°
C. Scope of Court of Federal Claims Review Limited to Proposed
Debarments
As noted in the introduction to the previous section, a disappointed
bidder may invoke the traditional jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims to award damages for breach of contract by alleging that the
government, through arbitrary and capricious action, breached an
implied contract to consider all bids fairly and honestly.241 Prior to
enactment of the ADR Act of 1996,2 the court also had authority
to grant injunctive relief for such a breach, but only if the breach
occurred and the protest was filed before the contract was award-
ed.24 With the enactment of the ADR Act, however, the court now
has jurisdiction over both pre- and post-award challenges to agency
CI. 1974)).
235. See id. at 449. The court accepted the successful bidder's explanation that it intended




239. See id. (citing Lockheed L, 4 F.3d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
240. See id. The Federal Circuit refused to address Bliss' twelve other claims, finding that
they either repeated the solicitation amendment argument or dealt with "the minutiae of the
procurement process ... which involve discretionary determinations of procurement officials
that a court will not second guess" Id. (citing Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d
1044, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Small errors made by the procuring agency are not sufficient
grounds for rejecting an entire procurement."); Lockheed /1, 4 F.3d at 958).
241. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
242. Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12, 110 Stat. 3870 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
243. SeeFederal Courts ImprovementAct of 1982, § 133(a),96 Stat. 25,39-40, repealed byADR
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(a) (2), 110 Stat. 3870.
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procurement decisions, albeit on the basis of a statutory grant
independent of the implied contract theory.2"
In IMCO, Inc. v. United States,2' the Federal Circuit held that the
Court of Federal Claims did not have jurisdiction to review the
propriety of the government's decision to debar246 IMCO because
the actual debarment occurred after the solicitation at issue was can-
celed.247 Instead, the Court of Federal Claims could review the
agency's action only in light of the proposed debarment, which
occurred before the cancellation of the solicitation.24 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of IMCO's protest on the grounds that
the proposed debarment was not arbitrary or capricious.249 IMCO
was in line for the award of an Army contract when the government's
pre-award survey team, which had determined that IMCO was not a
"responsible contractor," recommended against awarding the contract
to IMCO." ° Even prior to this recommendation, however, an Army
procurement official who had no responsibility for this particular
procurement had recommended that IMCO be debarred.251
Prior to contract award, the Army's debarment official notified
IMCO that it was proposed for debarment, rendering it ineligible to
244. See 28 U.S.CA § 1491(b) (1)-(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). The Act states:
(b) (1) Both the United States Court of Federal Claims and the district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to renderjudgment on an action by an interested
party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a
proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged
violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed
procurement. Both the United States Court of Federal Claims and the district courts
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to entertain such an action without regard
to whether suit is instituted before or after the contract is awarded. (2) To afford
relief in such an action, the courts may award any relief that the court considers
proper, including declaratory and injunctive relief except that any monetary relief shall
be limited to bid preparation and proposal costs.
L
245. 97 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
246. Debarment is an "action taken by a designated agency official to exclude a contractor
from government contracting and government-approved subcontracting for a specific period of
time." COMMrriEE ON DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION, SECTION OF PUBIC CONTRAcr LAW,
AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO SUSPENSION AND DEaARMENT ii (2d
ed. 1996).
247. See IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Ordinarily, a
debarment decision must be challenged in federal district court under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). SeeATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 682
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that contractor generally would attack suspension in district court,
although particular facts of case allowed Court of Federal Claims such jurisdiction).
248. See IMCO, 97 F.3d at 1426-27.
249. See id. at 1426.
250. See id. at 1423; see also FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 9.103 (1996) (requiring that contracts only be
awarded to responsible contractors).
251. See IMCO, 97 F.3d at 1427.
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receive the contract.2" 2 After determining that the remaining bids
were unreasonably high, the contracting officer canceled the
solicitation. 53  Although IMCO submitted a written response
challenging the proposed debarment on several grounds, the Army,
two months after canceling the solicitation, debarred IMCO.2 4
IMCO, seeking to overturn the debarment and reinstate the solicita-
tion, brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims, which held that the
actual debarment decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the
cancellation of the solicitation breached the government's duty to
fairly and honestly consider IMCO's bid. 5
On appeal, the question arose whether the Court of Federal Claims
had jurisdiction to review the propriety of the actual debarment.
256
The court, while recognizing that it was the proposed debarment that
eliminated IMCO from consideration and ultimately led to cancella-
tion of the solicitation, asserted that "the validity of the debarment
was 'inextricably linked' with the procurement, and that it would be
unable to provide meaningful relief unless it considered the actual
debarment.'" 25 ' The Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning and
found that the cases relied on by IMCO did not allow the extension
of the trial court's jurisdiction to review a debarment decision
occurring after the challenged procurement action. 258  In Electro-
Methods, Inc. v. United States,259 one of the cases relied on by the trial
court in IMCO, the court held that it had jurisdiction over claims
stemming from an allegedly unfair suspension, but only over those
claims related to contracts that had not yet been awarded.2 °
Similarly, in ATL, Inc. v. United States,261 the court held that it
"undoubtedly had jurisdiction" over a protester's complaint alleging
constructive suspension, but again only because the contract at issue
had not yet been awarded.262 The court concluded from these cases
252. See id. at 1424; see also 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a), (d) (4) (1995) (noting firms proposed for
debarment are precluded from receiving government contracts).
253. See IMCO, 97 F.3d at 1424.
254. See id.
255. See IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 33 Fed. C. 312 (1995), afftd, 97 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
256. See IMCO, 97 F.3d at 1424.
257. Md at 1425 (quoting IMCO, 33 Fed. Cl. at 316).
258. See id. at 1425-26; see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818
(1988) (stating that it is an "age-old rule that a court may not in any case, even in the interest
ofjustice, extend its jurisdiction where none exists").
259. 728 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
260. See Electro-Methods, Inc. v. United States, 728 F.2d 1471, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
fact that the court had jurisdiction over at least some of the claims allowed it to review the
propriety of the suspension. See id
261. 736 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
262. See ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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that only actions before the cancellation of the solicitation could have
deprived IMCO's bid of fair and honest consideration and invoked
the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims; thus, that court erred
in extending its review to encompass the legality of the actual
debarment which occurred well after cancellation. 65
In other words, even if an actual debarment is arbitrary and
capricious, it cannot invalidate a contract award or solicitation
cancellation that occurred previously.26 As for the validity of the
proposed debarment, the Federal Circuit concluded that IMCO had
not met its burden of proving that the decision was arbitrary and
265capricious.
The premise of the Federal Circuit's limitation in IMCO of the
Court of Federal Claims' review is based on the then limited jurisdic-
tion of the court to hear only pre-award protests .26  Now that the
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over pre- and post-award
protests, 267 IMCO's rationale is no longer valid. In future decisions,
the Court of Federal Claims arguably should consider a debarment
decision, pre- or post-award, as long as the review is in the context of
an alleged violation of a statute or regulation in connection with a
procurement or proposed procurement."2
D. Burden of Proof on Protester to Show it Suffers Prejudice from Alleged
Procurement Errors
It has long been well established that in order to challenge
successfully an agency's procurement decision, the protester must
show not only a significant error in the procurement process, but also
that the error prejudiced the bidder's interests. 69 Court and board
decisions, however, have used a wide variety of terminology to
describe what constitutes a prejudicial error. For example, more than
a decade ago in CAC, Inc.-Fed. v. United States,27° the Federal Circuit
stated that a disappointed bidder must show that "there was a
263. See IMCO, 97 F.3d at 1426-27.
264. See id. at 1426.
265. See id. at 1427. First, while there was evidence that the Army official who initially
recommended debarment did so for an impermissibly punitive purpose, there was no evidence
that the debarment official who made the decision had any such motive. See id The court also
rejected IMCO's due process arguments because the debarment decision was made in
accordance with the procedures set out at 48 G.F.R. § 9.406, and because IMCO had the
opportunity to and did respond to the notice of proposed debarment. See id.
266. See id. at 1425.
267. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
268. See id.
269. SeeCentral Ark. Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1388,1389 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
270. 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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substantial chance that [it] would receive an award ....27 Other
forums looked for error that "adversely affected plaintiff's chances of
selection"272 or for "any actual adverse effect on the procurement
process."
273
Most recently, in Data General Corp. v. Johnson,74 the Federal
Circuit reformulated its definition of prejudice:
We think that the appropriate standard is that, to establish
prejudice, a protester must show that, had it not been for the
alleged error in the procurement process, there was a reasonable
likelihood that the protester would have been awarded the con-
tract.
2 75
The court called this a "refinement and clarification" of the "substan-
tial chance" language of CAC. 276 The court further explained that
this language strikes a reasonable balance between the need for
efficiency in the procurement process versus the need for fairness and
integrity in the process.277
In this case, Data General failed to show prejudicial error because
it did not establish that, absent the alleged errors in the procurement
process, there was a reasonable likelihood that it would have been
awarded the contract. 27 Data General, along with four other
companies, had submitted competitive bids for a best-value procure-
ment of automated data processing equipment.2 9  The solicitation
stated that technical factors would be significantly more important
than cost.280  Upon noticing several pricing discrepancies in IBM's
best and final offer ("BAFO"), the contracting officer asked IBM two
questions about the discrepancies, the answers to which substantially
lowered IBM's bid price. 281 Because Data General's BAFO price was
significantly higher than IBM's as revised, while its technical score was
only slightly higher than IBM's, the General Services Administration
271. GAC, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567,1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Morgan
Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 619 F.2d 892, 896 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
272. TRW Envtl. Safety Sys., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 33, 69 (1989).
273. TRW Inc., GSBCA No. 11309-P. 92-1 B.CA (CCH) 24,389, at 121,789 (1991).
274. 78 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
275. Data Gen. Corp. v.Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
276. See id. at 1563.
277. See id. ("The standard reflects a reasonable balance between the importance of (1)
averting unwarranted interruptions of and interferences with the procurement process and (2)
ensuring that protesters who have been adversely affected by allegedly significant error in the
procurement process have a forum available to vent their grievances.").
278. See id.
279. See id. at 1558 (specifying that equipment was for use by United States Forest Service).
280. See id.
281. See i&. at 1558-59 (noting that GSA then determined that "IBM providerd] the best
overall value to satisfy the government's needs").
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("GSA") awarded the contract to IBM.2"2 One disappointed bidder
filed a protest with GSBCA in which Data General and another bidder
intervened, but Data General later voluntarily withdrew.3 GSA
then moved to dismiss the protest with prejudice, stipulating that the
contract had been awarded in violation of the FAR.3  Upon
dismissal, GSA terminated the IBM contract for the convenience of
the government 
2 81
Thereafter, based on the analysis of the bids in the initial procure-
ment and a subsequent cost technical tradeoff report, GSA "reinstat-
ed" the original contract with IBM.2 8 In response, Data General
filed a protest on the grounds that the contracting officer's post-BAFO
inquiry about IBM's price discrepancies was an impermissible
discussion that allowed IBM, but not Data General, the opportunity
to revise its bid. 7 Once bidders have submitted their BAFOs, the
government may seek "clarification "288 of a bid, but "discus-
sions" 2 9 with a particular bidder are forbidden so as to prevent that
bidder from gaining an unfair advantage over other bidders by
making its bid more favorable."° The Board did not reach the issue
of whether the contracting officer's communication with IBM was a
clarification or a discussion, however, because it concluded that "[a] ny
282. See id. at 1559.
283. See id.
284. See id. Specifically, GSA stipulated that the contract award to IBM violated Federal
Acquisition Regulation § 15.612(d), which requires, inter alia, supporting documentation that
provides the basis and reasons for the selection decision. See id. at 1564 (citing 48 C.F.R.
§ 15.612(d) (1994)).
285. See id. at 1559.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 1559-60. Because GSA had stipulated in the previous protest that the IBM
contract was awarded in violation of the FAR, Data General also argued that GSA should be
judicially estopped from denying that the reinstated IBM contract was also illegally awarded. See
i. at 1564-65. The court rejected this argument, explaining that judicial estoppel is intended
to protect the court, not the litigants, from the perversion of the judicial process, and thus a
court may exercise discretion in deciding whether to invoke the doctrine. See i& at 1565. Here,
the board did not abuse that discretion because (1) the earlier protest and GSA's stipulation did
not relate to the propriety of the selection of IBM over Data General, and (2) GSA relied on
additional information in reinstating the award that it did not have when it made the original
award. See i.
288. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.601 (defining "clarification" in this context to mean "communication
with an offeror for the sole purpose of eliminating minor irregularities, informalities, or
apparent clerical mistakes in the proposal. ... [C]larification does not give the offeror an
opportunity to revise or modify its proposal").
289. See id. (defining "discussion" to mean "any oral or written communication between the
Government and an offeror ... that (a) involves information essential for determining the
acceptability of a proposal, or (b) provides the offeror an opportunity to revise or modify its
proposal").
290. See Data Gen. Corp., 78 F.3d at 1561.
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improprieties in the clarification/discussion process have not
prejudiced [Data General] .,291
The Federal Circuit agreed. 92 The court rejected Data General's
argument that, had the contracting officer not contacted IBM but
instead had selected an awardee based on IBM's original higher
prices, Data General would have had a reasonable chance of receiving
the contract 293 The court insisted that in order to show the requi-
site prejudice, Data General had to prove that, absent the communica-
tions, it would have had a reasonable likelihood of being awarded the
contract. 21 This burden, according to the court, had not been
met.
295
First, Data General's BAFO price was substantially higher than even
IBM's original higher prices, and the SSA testified that his determina-
tion would not have changed had he evaluated the BAFOs without
revising IBM's original bid.296 Also, the Federal Circuit held that
even if GSA had reopened discussions to communicate with all
bidders, Data General would not have had reason to lower its price
because (1) it did not know of BM's lower price, and (2) it admitted
that its strategy was to provide a higher performance product at
higher cost 297  Therefore, the court concluded that Data General
had failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of receiving the
contract in the absence of the contracting officer's communications
with IBM.2 98 Data General had failed to state a claim that the govern-
ment had breached the implied contract to consider its bid fairly and
honestly, and thus the company had established no grounds for
recovery.
Judge Newman issued a strong dissent in Data General arguing that
after the contract was terminated, it could not simply be reinstated as
if nothing had ever happened .2  The dissent pointed out that the
291. Id.
292. See id. at 1562. The court also agreed with the Board's decision that because the
adverse agency action that prompted the protest was the reinstatement and not the original
award of the contract, the protest was timely when it was filed within 10 days of the reinstate-
ment. See id. at 1560. Although the communications occurred prior to the original award, the
court stated that "those actions are now placed in the new context of the recent adverse agency
action, the reselection of IBM." Id.
293. See id. at 1563.
294. See id. at 1562.
295. See id. ("Data General presented no evidence ... that ... it would have reduced its




299. See id. at 1566 (Newman,J., dissenting) (stating that in her view, "the agency's violation
of law [should] not be simply ignored").
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regulation relied on by the government as authority for reinstating
the contract only contemplates reinstatement of a partially terminated
contract later determined to have been improvidently terminated.3 °
More important, the dissent urged that Data General should have
been required to show only that it would have had a "substantial
chance" of receiving the contract.'01 The dissent found that Data
General had made such a showing, particularly in view of the fact that
the technology in the initial bids was already obsolete when IBM's
contract was reinstated and a new procurement could well have been
on a different basis. 02 Judge Newman summarized, "[t]he contract
was over, and its immediate re-award, with no further procurement,
was improper, and was validly protested by a competitor who had a
substantial chance of success in a new procurement.""03
Another 1996 case, Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher,3°4 presented the
Federal Circuit with an opportunity to restate its prejudice standard.
Significantly, the court recognized that "[t] his is a matter of continu-
ing vitality in other forums, beyond the particularity of the Brooks
Act. So it is worthy of more than passing consideration notwith-
standing the loss of the board's protest authority.""0 8
The court again explained that it adopted the "reasonable
likelihood" test in an effort unify the various verbal formulations used
by the Court of Federal Claims and the GSBCA in their compliance
with the controlling "substantial chance" test. 8 The court stressed
that the "reasonable likelihood" standard was nothing more than a
"refinement and clarification" of the "substantial chance" test because
that test could only be changed or overruled by in banc consider-
ation. 0 1 The court thus rejected Statistica's interpretation, which
echoed that of some commentators, that the "reasonable likelihood"
test imposed a more onerous standard on a protester than did the
300. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 49.102(d) (1994)).
301. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
302. See id. (Newman,J., dissenting) ("After the government voided the initial award, there
was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Data General might not have succeeded in a new
procurement.")
303. Id. (Newman,J., dissenting).
304. 102 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
305. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577,1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (referencing Brooks
Automatic Data ProcessingAct, 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-355, §§ 1431-
1439, 108 Stat. 3234, 3292-94 (1994) (to be codified as amended to 40 U.S.C. § 759(f))).
306. See id. at 1581. The court further noted that the GAO, even though not required to do
so,just prior to Data General had harmonized its prejudice standard with the "substantial chance"
test. See id. (holding that GAO "will not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a
reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions, that is, unless the protester
demonstrates that, but for the agency's action, it would have had a substantial chance of
receiving the award" (citing McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, 96-1 CPD 1 54)).
307. See id. at 1581-82.
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"substantial chance" test.' The court explained that while a
"likelihood" generally connotes a higher probability than a "chance,"
the modifier "reasonable" connotes a lower standard than "substan-
tial."
309
Thus, the court concluded, the two standards represent equal
burdens for establishing prejudice. ° In order to remove any doubt
about the court's intentions, the court firmly stated: "Rather than
engage in verbal gymnastics,... suffice it to say that Data General did
not, as it could not, replace the 'substantial chance' standard with a
more demanding one. Morgan Business and CACT remain control-
ling."
3 11
On the facts of the case, the court affirmed the Board's determina-
tion that Statistica had not established the requisite showing of
prejudicial error in order to justify reief.31  The services contract
at issue required the contractor to provide personnel for various
positions, and established minimum wage rates according to job
classifications.1 The contracting officer issued an amendment
seeking to clarify which personnel positions in the contract correlated
to which classification wage rates, but Statistica and Orkand, the
eventual winner, did not interpret the amendment in the same
way.
3 1 4
On appeal, the court rejected Statistica's argument that Orkand's
bid failed to comply with the amendment's mandatory requirements
regarding wage rates.3 15 The court held that the amendment was
patently ambiguous as to whether the requirements were mandatory,
and that because Statistica had failed to meet its duty to seek
clarification it was precluded from arguing that Orkand's bid was
noncompliant31 6 The court also rejected Statistica's argument that
the contracting officer misled it into believing that its interpretation
was correct by requesting the submission of BAFOs even though he
knew that Statistica and Orkand had interpreted the amendment
308. See id. at 1582; see also Defense Procuremen, 38 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACrOR 147
(Mar. 27, 1996) (noting that Data General "appears to substantially increase the protester's
burden").
309. See Statistica, 102 F.3d at 1582.
310. See id.
311. 1&
312. See id. (stating that Statistica must have been able to prove that "there was a substantial
chance it would have received the contract award but for [the relevant] error").
313. See id. at 1579.
314. See id. at 1579-80.
315. See id. at 1582.
316. See id; see also infra Part ILA (providing in-depth discussion of other 1996 Federal
Circuit cases regarding patent ambiguities).
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differently.117 This holding also was based on Statistica's failure to
seek clarification.
318
Finally, the court rejected Statistica's argument that the contracting
officer committed prejudicial error by failing to include a FAR clause
that allegedly would have allowed Statistica to submit a lower bid. 19
Relying on the SSA's testimony, the court found that even if the
clause had been included, Statistica would not have lowered its bid
enough to give it a "reasonable likelihood" of receiving the award.320
Although the court agreed that the resulting decreased price
difference could have "raise[d] the chance that Statistica might have
received the award, the chance was not substantial." 2 1 Thus, the
court held that Statistica failed to meet the Federal Circuit's standard
for prejudice necessary to prevail in a bid protest.
322
E. Contractual Validity-Offer and Acceptance-Unilateral Contracts
Under long-standing principles of contract law, three familiar
elements are typically required for the formation of a contract: offer,
acceptance, and consideration.32 An offer is defined as "the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain
is invited and will conclude it." 24 An offeree may accept the offer
by "a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof.., in a manner
invited or required by the offer."3" To render an offeror's promise
enforceable, however, an offeree must provide consideration, which
is some "performance or return promise.., sought by the promisor
in exchange for his promise.""' A unilateral contract is formed by
an offer, the consideration for which is the performance of an act or
forbearance to act.327





321. Id. (noting that "Statistica's technical advantage was slight").
322. See id.
323. SeeRESTATEmENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS §§ 17(1), 22(1) (1981) [hereinafter RESrATE-
MENT].
324. Ii § 24.
325. IM. § 50.
326. Id § 71(2).
327. See id §§ 30, 45, 45 cmt. a, 71 (defining a unilateral contract as a contract wherein an
offer does not invite promissory acceptance but instead calls for the other party to accept by
rendering performance); ARTHUR L CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.23, at 89 (Joseph M.
Perillo rev. ed. 1993) (determining that when an offeror seeks performance rather than a return
promise, the offeror proposes a unilateral contract).
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In Wells Fargo Bank v. United States,328 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the applicability of these principles to government contracts law. The
court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the Farmers Home
Administration ("FmHA") had made a conditional commitment
constituting a unilateral contract to guarantee a loan that Wells Fargo
had accepted by performing the conditions specified and by begin-
ning performance by making the loan.S" The court rejected the
government's argument that no unilateral contract was formed,
noting that the Conditional Commitment stated that "when these
conditions are met, [the Administration] will issue a loan note
guarantee."3" Before the FmHA would issue the guarantee, the
Conditional Commitment required that Wells Fargo certify that it
"had no knowledge of any adverse change, financial or otherwise, in
the Borrower, his business, or any parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates
since it requested a Loan Note Guarantee.""' Because Wells Fargo
provided that certification, and satisfied all other conditions, the court
ruled that the FmHA was required to issue the loan guarantee and
FmHA's refusal to do so constituted a breach of contract.
33 2
Wells Fargo represents another line of Federal Circuit precedent in
which the court has refused to permit the government to escape its
contractual obligations.33 Significantly, the court cited to its 1995
in banc decision in Winstar, which at the time Wells Fargo was decided
was still pending before the United States Supreme Court, for the
proposition that "[w]hen the plaintiffs satisfied the conditions
imposed on them by the contracts, the government's contractual
obligations became effective .... ,1 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court affirmed Winstar's ruling that when the government abrogates
its contractual promises through post-contract legislation, it must
compensate the contractor.33
The trend in the Federal Circuit, at least as represented in Wells
Fargo and Winstar, has been to protect contractors from attempts by
328. 88 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
329. Wells Fargo Bank v. United States, 88 F.3d 1012, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
330. Id. at 1020.
331. 1&
332. See id. at 1021 (citing Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (in banc) ("When the plaintiffs satisfied the conditions imposed on them by the contracts,
the government's contractual obligations became effective . . . ."), affld, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996)).
333. See generally Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1531. But see infra Part IV.B (providing discussion of line
of decisions culminating in Kiygoski that have construed narrowly the Tomcello plurality's
"changed circumstances" limitation on government's right to terminate contract for convenience
and thereby limiting that decision to its facts).
334. Wells Fargo, 88 F.3d at 1021 (citing Wnstar, 64 F.3d at 1545).
335. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2459 (1996) (plurality opinion); see
also id. at 2473 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the government to avoid granting the contractors the benefit of the
bargain by escaping its contractual obligations."s Nonetheless, as
discussed below in Section IV.C., the restrictive approach the Federal
Circuit has taken on the issue of recoverable damages has limited the
impact of the court's liability determination by scaling back severely
the amount contractors can recover.37
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, PERFORMANCE, AND
ADMINISTRATION
A. Interpreting Contracts with Ambiguous Terms
A contract term is "ambiguous" when it is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation." Before finding that a contract is
ambiguous, courts should ascertain whether the differing interpreta-
tions proffered by the parties, either at the time of contract formation
or at other pre-dispute times, are reasonably consistent with the
contract language. 39 Generally, courts should apply this and other
rules of contract interpretation whenever possible to avoid potential
conflicts and ambiguities in contract language.' If an ambiguity
persists after applying these rules, the court should then determine
336. See generally Wells Fargo, 88 F.3d at 1012 (holding that government failed to honor its
commitment to bank); Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1531 (holding that United States breached contract
with financial institutions).
337. See infra notes 694-700 and accompanying text.
338. See H & M Moving, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 660, 667 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ("(T11he rule
has long been established that a provision in a contract which is unclear and capable of being
interpreted in at least two reasonable ways is ambiguous.").
339. SeeEdward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701,705 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that ambiguous contracts are generally construed according to the parties' construction, as
demonstrated by their conduct before a conflict arises); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United
States, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (commenting on the general rules of contract
interpretation, including the precept that the parties' interpretations control the analysis), quoted
in Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Tacoma v. United
States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on pre-dispute extrinsic evidence to rule that
intent of parties controlled and rendered contract unambiguous); RESTATEMENT, supra note 323,
§ 215.
340. See, e.g., Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (construing
specific term to control over general term to avoid potential conflict and ambiguity); United
States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (harmonizing two
potentially conflicting contract terms to avoid finding ambiguity); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 323, § 203(d) ("[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning
to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or
of no effect."); 3A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 547 (1960) ("The concrete is more readily
understandable than the abstract and more likely to be accurately expressed."); 4 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 619 (3d ed. 1961) ("[WJhere possible all the language
used should be given a reasonable meaning.").
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whether the ambiguity is latent or patent, and apply the appropriate
rules applicable to each.'I
If a court determines an ambiguity is latent, it should invoke the
rule of contra proferentem and interpret the ambiguity in favor of the
nondrafting party if that party's interpretation is reasonable.342 If,
however, the ambiguity is obvious and therefore patent, the court will
determine whether the contractor satisfied the resulting duty to
inquire." If the contractor failed to inquire, the court will bar the
contractor from challenging the government's interpretation of the
ambiguity if the government's interpretation is reasonable.3
In perhaps its most controversial government contracts decision of
1996, a divided Federal Circuit panel in Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft
Co.45 applied the above-stated rules to find a patent ambiguity and
rule in favor of the government despite findings of fact by the ASBCA
that the pre-dispute intent of the parties belied the existence of an
ambiguity.3 It is too early to tell whether Cessna Aircraft will signal
a trend on the court's part to accept readily the government's
increasingly used "patent ambiguity" argument to deny contractors the
right to recover on valid claims.
The primary dispute in Cessna Aircraft centered around whether
Cessna was entitled to an equitable adjustment under its flight
training services contract for an alleged change the Navy made to the
contract's requirements syllabus. 7 The change increased the
number of hours of training Cessna was required to give each student
from fifty-eight to seventy-eight hours in order to use the maximum
number of training hours available under the contract per year.'
341. See H & M Moving, 499 F.2d at 671-72. The distinction between a latent and patent
ambiguity is that the latter is "obvious, gross [or] glaring." I& at 671 (stating that where
ambiguity is patent, contractor has duty to inquire about it).
342. See, e.g., WPC Enters., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 876 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (applying
rule of contra proferentem against the government as drafter because nondrafting party's
interpretation was within zone of reasonableness).
343. See id. at 876-77. The nondrafting party's duty to inquire arises because, when the
nondrafting party knew or should have known of the ambiguity, the nondrafting party was in
the position to avoid the dispute. See S.O.G. ofArk. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 125,131 (1976)
(explaining that the principle obviates unnecessary disputes and advances the goal of informed
bidding).
344. See Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that burden
is on contractor to seek clarification of patent ambiguities); Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d
647,651 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (emphasizing the "value and importance of a duty of inquiry in achieving
fair and expeditious administration of government contracts").
345. 98 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1996). One of the authors of this Article was counsel for
appellee.
346. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that Cessna
did not meet its obligation of inquiry).
347. See id. at 1299.
348. See id. at 1302.
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Cessna entered into a firm fixed-price services contract to assist in
radar and navigation training for undergraduate naval flight officers
over a five-year span. 9 The Navy's Request for Information ("RFI")
stated that the training system should be designed to support from
300-350 students per year, and that "for planning purposes," the
estimated flying hours needed to conduct the training would range
from 12,000-17,000 hours per year.50 The RFI did not specify any
limit on the number of flight training hours per student.51
In response to questions regarding the rate of flight training
services posed by potential bidders at a pre-solicitation conference,
the Navy stated that it did not intend to modify the training syllabus
and referred the bidders to the upcoming Request for Quotations
("RFQ"). 52 The RFQ stated in two different sections that the
services to be provided under the contract "shall consist of an annual
rate of 17,000 airborne training service hours (approximately 58
airborne training service hours per graduated student). In
response to questions regarding the rate of flight training services
posed by bidders at a post-solicitation conference, the Navy stated
repeatedly that the contractor should propose the annual rate for
services based on the RFQ requirements." Cessna based both its
proposal and its BAFO on the training syllabus attached to the RFQ
and on the 58-hour per student provision.3 5 Three years into
contract performance, after realizing that it was not using 17,000
hours of training per year, the Navy changed the training syllabus in
the contract to increase the number of hours per student from fifty-
eight to seventy-eight hours of flight training per year.
3 56
Cessna filed a claim for an equitable adjustment for this work and
subsequently appealed to the ASBCA.35 7 The Board rejected the
Navy's argument that it had contracted for an unqualified 17,000
hours of training per year, instead finding that the Navy expressly
promised Cessna that it would require no more than approximately
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 1299-1300.
352. See id. at 1300.
353. Id
354. See id. (noting that Cessna stated these facts specifically in its proposal and BAFO).
355. See id. at 1302.
356. See id. The Navy also changed the scope of services it used under the contract,
requiring Cessna to transport non-student passengers, and to perform rescue and target flights.
The Navy did not appeal the board's ruling that Cessna was entitled to an equitable adjustment
for this work. See id. at 1303.
357. See id. at 1302.
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fifty-eight hours of training per student." The Board also found
that the Navy had breached its promise to not modify the require-
ments of the training syllabus." 9 The Board concluded that the
58-hour provision in the contract precluded the Navy from increasing
the number of hours per student beyond fifty-eight without some type
of price adjustment." °
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
Board erred by interpreting the 58-hour provision to qualify the
17,000-hour provision.6 The government alleged that the 58-hour
provision was only a non-binding estimate. 62 Alternatively, the
government asserted that Cessna was barred from recovery because
Cessna's interpretation created a patent ambiguity giving rise to a duty
to seek clarification prior to submitting its proposal, which it failed to
do."s Cessna responded that the Board correctly interpreted the
contract, and that any ambiguity in the contract was latent, requiring
the contract to be interpreted in Cessna's favor under the doctrine of
contra proferentem because its interpretation was reasonable.36
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit, ruling in the government's
favor, first concluded that the Navy reasonably interpreted the 58-
hour provision to constitute a non-binding estimate.365 Moreover,
the panel majority, with questionable logic, applied the common law
order of precedence rule that specific terms control over general
terms and concluded that the 17,000-hour provision was a specific
provision that controlled over the general 58-hour per student
provision." Finally, the majority ruled that even if Cessna reason-
ably construed the 58-hour provision to qualify the 17,000-hour
requirement, this construction gave rise to a "patent ambiguity."67
Because Cessna did not satisfy its obligation to seek clarification prior
to submitting its proposal, the panel majority barred Cessna from
relying on its interpretation and from claiming any right to an
equitable price adjustment.3"
358. See id. at 1302-03.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 1303.




365. See id. at 1305.
366. See id. (citing Hills Material Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514,517 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The panel
majority provides no rationale for why the 17,000 hour provision is a specific term and the 58
hour per student provision is a general term. The authors posit that a reverse approach is a
more reasonable interpretation.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 1306.
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In dissentJudge Newman noted that the panel majority's approach
contravened the well established tenet of contract interpretation that
the parties' intent revealed by pre-dispute interpretations should
govern over post hoc, litigation-induced interpretations. 69 Judge
Newman emphasized the high level of deference that the court was
required to pay to the Board's findings of fact, and that none of the
statutory conditions for reversal had been met. 70 The Board, after
hearing testimony from both sides, had determined that the 17,000-
hour limit was understood the same way by both sides when the
contract was bid.37' Specifically, both sides testified that their
understanding was that the 17,000-hour figure was a maximum that
Cessna was required to provide only if the Navy increased the number
of students in the training program.372 The Board held that the
Navy was bound, however, by its representations in the training
syllabus, the pre-bid explanations, and the contract itself that Cessna
would not be required to provide more than fifty-eight flight hours of
training per student.37 Judge Newman found no error justifying a
reversal of these findings. 4
Judge Newman further took issue with the "strange" consequence
that arose from the court's finding that the ambiguity in the RFQ was
patent." Not only did the court accept as reasonable the Navy's
litigation-induced interpretation, but the court also precluded Cessna
from challenging that interpretation and reversed the Board's holding
"on the quixotic ground that the contractor should have foreseen and
resolved the dispute before bidding on the contract. "376 To the
extent that it effectively barred from judicial review the merits of the
contract interpretation issue, Judge Newman viewed the majority's
opinion as frustrating the court's role in providing for the "fair and
just resolution of contract disputes."
377
369. See id. at 1306-08 (Newman, J., dissenting).
370. See id. at 1307-08 (Newman,J., dissenting); see also 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1994) (relating
that court may overturn board's factual findings where a decision is "fraudulent, or arbitrary,
or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or if such decision is not
supported by substantial evidence").
371. See Daltn, 98 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., dissenting).
372. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
373. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
374. See id. at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting).
375. See id. (Newman,J., dissenting) (noting that panel majority refused to consider merits
of Cessna's contract interpretation argument).
376. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
377. I& (Newman,J., dissenting).
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A fundamental precept of contract law is that the contracting
parties' intent determines the proper interpretation of their con-
tract." When called upon to resolve a dispute over contract
interpretation, "the avowed purpose and primary function of the
court is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties."' 79 By
characterizing the Navy's post-dispute interpretation as reasonable, the
majority violated the rule that a party's interpretation when no
controversy existed is the most reliable means of determining the
parties' intent.' Only by characterizing the Navy's post-dispute
interpretation as "reasonable," and ignoring the Navy's pre-dispute
interpretation, could the majority find an ambiguity.
Having created this ambiguity, the majority concluded that the
ambiguity was patent and barred Cessna from relief because it failed
to inquire regarding the ambiguity during the contract's formation.
As the Board found, however, both Cessna and the Navy at the time
of contract formation interpreted the contract in the same way. s'
The majority's analysis thus succeeds in permitting the government to
interject a litigation-induced, post hoe interpretation of the contract,
thereby creating a fictional patent ambiguity to bar the contractor
from challenging the government's position. Judge Newman's dissent
concluded that "the panel majority, in barring the contractor from
the opportunity to challenge the goverment's current interpretation,
disserves the nation in its dependence on private contractors to meet
governmental needs. " 2
The Federal Circuit also addressed an ambiguity issue in Grumman
Data Systems Corp. v. Dalton,' a decision devoid of the myriad
problems addressed in the above discussion of Cessna Aircraft. The
court in Grumman Data upheld the GSBCA's finding that both the
contract provision at issue and the Navy's answer to a bidder's post-
378. See Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(discussing fundamental contract principles and importance of parties' intent in construing
ambiguous contracts).
379. Alvin, Ltd. v. USPS, 816 F.2d 1562, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting 4 WILLSTON, supra
note 340, § 601, at 304).
380. See 4 WILUSTON, supra note 340, § 623, at 811.
381. See Dalton, 98 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that Board ruled in favor
of Cessna after hearing testimony to effect that both parties interpreted contract in same
manner at contract formation).
382. 1& at 1308 (Newman, J., dissenting) (observing that "'punctilious fulfillment of
contractual obligations is essential to the maintenance of the credit of the public as well as
private debtors'" (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2459-60 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (citation omitted)).
383. 88 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For a more thorough summary of the facts of this case
and a discussion of the scope of review issue, see supra Part IIA.
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solicitation question regarding the provision were patently ambigu-
ous.1s4 The GSBCA had held that Grumman's failure to seek
clarification of either (1) a patently ambiguous contract provision, or
(2) the Navy's patently ambiguous answer, barred the contractor from
arguing the correctness of its interpretation of the provision.M
Grumman challenged the Navy's award of a computer contract to
another bidder, Intergraph, on the grounds that, inter alia,
Intergraph's proposal failed to meet one of the solicitation's
minimum mandatory requirements ("MMR").386 The solicitation
stated that the Simulation Accelerator "'shall simulate ... at least (1)
million evaluations per second.'"' 7  Grumman argued that this
required the simulator to be able to carry out a complete simulation
algorithm at least one million times per second, which Intergraph's
system concededly could not do.' Intergraph and the Navy,
however, interpreted the MMR to mean that the simulator only had
to be able to record at least one million changes per second.8 9
The Board found both interpretations plausible, but found that
Grumman had failed to carry its burden of showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Intergraph's and the Navy's interpretation
was wrong.3g  On appeal, Grumman argued alternatively (1) that
the simulator requirement was unambiguous and that Grumman's
interpretation must prevail; (2) that any ambiguity was latent, and
thus Grumman's interpretation controlled under the doctrine of
contra proferentem; and (3) that Intergraph's proposal did not meet
even Intergraph's interpretation of the simulator requirement.
8 91
The court first decided, giving the Board's conclusion of law
"careful consideration and great respect," that the simulator require-
ment was ambiguous. 9 2  The court then considered whether the
ambiguity was patent so as to impose a duty to seek clarification. g
384. See Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
385. See id.
386. See id. at 995.




391. See id. at 996-97.
392. See id. at 997 (citing Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). Although Grumman pointed to a statement in Intergraph's own user's guide
that supported Grumman's interpretation, the Navy cited testimony by two witnesses-one
testified that he had never heard the term "evaluations per second" used as a simulator
performance measure, and another testified that the term "evaluations" is rarely used because




A patent ambiguity is one that is "obvious, gross, [or] glaring."89
Grumman offered no evidence to support its "bare assertion" that the
ambiguity, if any, was latent"95 In light of testimony that the term
"evaluations per second" was either unheard of or at least rarely used
in the industry in this context, and that at least one bidder specifically
inquired about the meaning of the provision, the court concluded
that the term was patently ambiguous. 96 As for the consequent
duty to seek clarification, there was "no dispute" that Grumman had
not sought clarification of the term prior to submitting its proposal,
which barred Grumman from arguing that its interpretation was
proper. 97 Grumman Data, in sum, follows recognized principles and
does not alter thejurisprudence of the Federal Circuit regarding rules
of construction and interpretation.
B. Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule is neither a rule of evidence nor one of
contract interpretation, but is instead a rule of substantive law that
defines the subject matter of interpretation.98 In general, the parol
evidence rule precludes a party from presenting evidence of prior
written or oral agreements that contradict or are inconsistent with an
integrated agreement." A "completely integrated" agreement is
one "adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the agreement."' An agreement is only partially
integrated if it "omits a consistent additional agreed term which is
(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or (b) such a term as in the
circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing.""'
Parol evidence is admissible to show whether and to what extent a
written agreement is integrated, to add consistent additional terms to
partially integrated agreements, and to resolve ambiguities whether
the agreement is integrated or not."°2 A court, using the general
rules of contract interpretation, may find that no ambiguity exists and
394. Id. (quoting H & M Moving Co. v. United States, 499 F.2d 660, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
395. See id. at 998 (recounting that Grumman did not argue or point to evidence in record
to support its assertion).
396. See id.
397. See id. In addition, as noted above, one bidder did submit a post-solicitation inquiry as
to the meaning of "one million evaluations per second"; the court found, however, that the
Navy's response was also patently ambiguous, and that neither Grumman nor another bidder
inquired to clarify the Navy's ambiguous answer. See id.
398. See RESrATEmENT, supra note 323, § 213 cmt. a.
399. See id. § 213 cmt. b.
400. Id.
401. I- § 216.
402. See id. § 214.
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thus exclude extrinsic evidence, or it may find an ambiguity and look
to parol evidence for a resolution."°s Although some jurisdictions
have allowed the admission of parol evidence to establish that a
seemingly unambiguous term is ambiguous, the Federal Circuit has
never subscribed to this rule.'
In McAbee Construction, Inc. v. United States,4°5 the court deter-
mined that the contract at issue was fully integrated and unambigu-
ous.4"6 Based on this predicate, the court reversed the trial court,
which had considered extrinsic evidence to resolve an alleged
ambiguity.4 7  The court stated that it would not hear extrinsic
evidence proffered to establish an ambiguity when the contract terms
are clear and unambiguous on their face.0
The contract at issue in McAbee granted an easement to the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")." The easement permit-
ted the Corps "to deposit, fill, spoil and waste material [on McAbee's
land] ... and to perform any other work necessary and incident to
the construction [project]."41° The easement also contained an
integration clause stating that "[a]ll terms and conditions with respect
to this [contract] are expressly contAined herein," and that no
representative of the United States had made any representation or
promise to McAbee that was not expressly contained in the con-
tract.
41
Upon expiration of the easement, McAbee sued the Corps for waste
and trespass, complaining that the Corps had breached the parties'
agreement to return the land at no higher than 165 feet above sea
level.4"2 The trial court recognized that the contract specified no
height limitation, but nonetheless concluded that the lack of such a
term created an ambiguity.48  Therefore, the court admitted
extrinsic evidence to find that the parties had agreed to a height limit
and that the Corps had breached this agreement, entitling McAbee
to damages for diminished property value. 4
403. See id. § 214 cmt. b.
404. See Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
405. 97 F.3d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
406. See McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
407. See id. at 1435 (finding that trial court incorrectly found contract terms ambiguous).
408. See id. ("Extrinsic evidence ... should not be used to introduce an ambiguity where
none exists." (quoting Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).





414. See id. The court awarded McAbee $328,000 for the diminution in fair market value of
the property. See i&.
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The Federal Circuit, on appeal, first addressed the issue of whether
the contract was fully integrated." 5 The court found that the clear
and unequivocal language in the integration clause created a "strong
presumption that the contract was ... a fully-integrated agree-
ment."" 6 This placed "an extremely heavy burden" on McAbee to
prove otherwise. 7 The evidence showed that the parties executed
the agreement after months of negotiations during which McAbee
had suggested a height limit, but no height limit agreement was ever
reached.1 Both the writing itself and the circumstances surround-
ing its execution demonstrated that the contract was fully integrat-
ed.4"9 Moreover, the parol evidence rule prohibited the use of
extrinsic evidence to add to or modify the terms of the contract
unless an ambiguity existed.420
Addressing the alleged ambiguity, the court invoked familiar canons
of contract interpretation: that interpretation begins with a contract's
plain meaning, and that courts must interpret a contract to give
meaning to all of its provisions.42  The court reaffirmed its view
that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to establish an ambigility when
the terms of a contract are clear on their face.
4 22
The contract language permitting the Corps to deposit fill and
waste on McAbee's land, and to perform any other work "necessary
and incident" to the project was not susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation.4' No provision of the contract limited
the amount of material that the Corps could deposit on McAbee's
land or addressed a height limitation." The court, therefore,
415. The Federal Circuit is bound by Court of Claims precedent which requires parol
evidence to be "admissible on the extent to which a written agreement is integrated, for... the
writing cannot prove its own integration." Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d
994 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
416. McAbee, 97 F.Sd at 1434.
417. See id. The court, citing United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2448-53, 2472 (1996),
suggested that the parties could have incorporated into the contract, through the integration
clause, any evidence of a height limitation agreement.
418. See McAbe, 97 F.3d at 1434.
419. See id.
420. See id. The court also rejected McAbee's argument that if the contract was only partially
integrated, extrinsic evidence was admissible to interpret the "necessary and incident" language.
See id. The court ruled that extrinsic evidence can be introduced only to add consistent
additional terms to a partially integrated contract. See i&. Thus, the only viable argument
McAbee could make to allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence was to claim that the
contract language was ambiguous. See id
421. See id. at 1435.
422. See i& This view differs with the one held previously by the court. See Blackburn v.
United States, 116 F. Supp. 584, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (stating that no contract term is
unambiguous until the intent of the parties, which "is the essence of any contract," is
established, and admitting extrinsic evidence to determine parties' intent).
423. See McAbee, 97 F.3d at 1435.
424. See id.
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rejected the trial court's finding of an ambiguity, and held that the
trial court's admission of extrinsic evidence was in error.4"
McAbee reaffirms the Federal Circuit's strict application of the parol
evidence rule to prevent reliance on extrinsic evidence to establish an
ambiguity when the meaning of contract terms are clear on their face.
While the vitality and force of the parol evidence rule has been
eroded to varying degrees in many jurisdictions, the Federal Circuit
still wields the doctrine as a powerful tool of contract interpretation.
C. Controlling Statutory Language Takes Precedence and Renders Invalid
Conflicting Contract Provisions
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the "power of the purse."426 The principle of separation of powers
requires that the executive and the judiciary respect any restriction
placed by Congress on the expenditure of federal funds.427 An
example of one such restriction on the government's ability to
contract is the Anti-Deficiency Act." s This Act prohibits a federal
employee or a federal agency from entering into a contract for the
future payment of money in excess of, or in advance of, an existing
appropriation unless otherwise authorized by law." Another
similar restriction prohibits the government from making advance
payments to its contractors unless specifically authorized by stat-
ute.4 0
In 1996, the Federal Circuit resolved a dispute concerning the
proper application of this restriction in the context of the government
purchase of commercial airline tickets. In American Airlines, Inc. v.
Austin,"' the court ruled that the government was entitled to
recoup advance payments made to airlines for unused tickets even
though the terms stated on the tickets limited the time allowed for
425. See id.
426. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
427. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (holding that it is "the duty of all
courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury").
428. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
429. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981, 987-88 (1996) (holding that the Anti-
Deficiency Act prohibits government procurement agencies from entering into contracts with
open-ended indemnity for third-party liability"). See generally Michael T.Janik & Margaret C.
Rhodes, Gould, Inc. v. United States: Contractor Claims for Relief Under Illegal Contracts with the
Government 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1976 (1996) ("The Anti-Deficiency Act protects the process by
which funds are appropriated and shields the Treasury from unauthorized debts incurred by
government representatives.").
430. See 31 U.S.C. § 3324 ("[A] payment under a contract to provide a service ... for the
United States Government may not be more than the value of the service already provided"
unless authorized by a specific law.").
431. 75 F.3d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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such recovery.4 32 Because the contract terms regarding the refund
time limits conflicted directly with the government's unrestricted
statutory right to recoup such advance payments, the contractual time
limits were held to be invalid.'
The dispute in Austin started when the GSA sent the airlines written
demands to refund $2.5 million for tickets the government purchased,
but did not use, between January 1985 and September 1 989."4
When GSA could not produce the unused tickets to the airlines, as
required under the regulations, GSA limited its refund claims to
tickets purchased between January 1985 and January 1986, totaling
about $333,000.1 Because GSA produced only a fraction of these
tickets, the airlines denied GSA's refund request, prompting GSA to
offset more than $300,000 in payments the government owed to the
airlines.
43 6
Filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
the airlines sought to recover the offset amount. 7  The only issue
on appeal was whether the district court properly granted the govern-
ment summary judgment on the airlines' claim that GSA was not
entitled to refunds because it had not sought them within the time
limits stated on the tickets.4' The court determined that "[a]
provision in a government contract that violates or conflicts with a
federal statute is invalid or void." 9 Thus, the issue was whether the
refund time limits stated on the tickets violated or conflicted with any
statutory right of the government reflected in the regulations that
432. American Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 75 F.3d 1535, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (concluding that
Congress intended to preserve government's entitlement to refund).
433. See id.
434. See id. at 1537 (describing essential facts of case and noting that none were dispositive).
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. See id. The trial court found that the airlines issued tickets to the government in
exchange for Government Transportation Requests ("GIR"), which state and incorporate the
federal regulations governing refunds. See id. Because the airlines accepted the GTRs, they were
bound by the federal regulations, not the contract terms stated on the tickets. See id. Because
the district court earlier had granted summary judgment to the airlines on their claim that the
refund demands for which GSA could not produce tickets violated federal regulations, the
amount at issue on appeal was only $41,000. See id at 1537 n.3.
438. See id at 1537. The Federal Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2)
(1994), which provides for appeals to that courtfrom federal district courts in specific instances,
in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c), which grants federal district courtsjurisdiction over set-
offs and counterclaims by the federal government against private plaintiffs. See Austin, 75 F.3d
at 1537.
439. Id. at 1538 (invalidating contractwith clause adjusting prices in violation of federal law)
(citing Urban Data Sys., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1147,1150-53 (Fed. Cir. 1993));Yosemite
Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 560 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (determining that contract
provisions violating federal procurement laws are unenforceable).
1997] 1857
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1807
placed a ten-year limit on the government's right to recovery by
offset.4 °
The court answered this question through analysis of the statutory
construction and legislative history of the relevant transportation
statutes, noting that the government has long been prohibited
statutorily from making advance payments to contractors unless
authorized by a specific law.441 The Transportation Payment Act of
1972 ("TPA")" authorizes the government to make advance
payments for passenger transportation services; however, the language
also clearly grants the government the right to recoup, "by deduction
or other means," advance payments for transportation services not
received, and does not place a time limit on such recovery.
44
Analyzing this provision in the light of the whole statute "and the
objects and policy of the law.., and giv[ing] it such construction as
will carry into execution the will of the legislature,"'5 the court
concluded that "Congress did not intend to limit the government's
ability to recover unused airline ticket refunds."'
The District Court concluded that Congress limited to three years
the time within which the government can deduct overcharge
amounts from subsequent bills due the carrier. 6 Congress also
limited to three years the time within which a carrier may file with the
government a claim for money owed to it."7 In the absence of any
time limitation on the government's right to recover advance
payments for unused tickets, however, the court determined that
Congress' intent was to grant the government an unrestricted right to
such recovery."5
Analysis of the TPA and the Transportation Act of 1940 ("1940
Act"), 9 which the TPA amended, supports this interpretation. The
1940 Act addressed complaints by passenger and freight carriers about
inordinate delays in receiving payment from the government by
waiving the prohibition against payment to such contractors prior to
440. See id. The airlines conceded that all applicable regulations were incorporated by
reference into the GTRs, but contended that the contract terms and the regulations were not
in conflict. See id- at 1537.
441. See id. at 1538.
442. 31 U.S.C. § 3726 (1994) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 66 (1940)).
443. See Austin, 75 F.3d at 1538-39 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3726(0).
444. Id. at 1539 (quoting Kokoszka v. Bedford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)).
445. Id
446. See id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b)).
447. See id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3726(a)).
448. See id.
449. Transportation Act of 1940, Ch. 722, § 322, 54 Stat. 955, 955 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3726 (1994)).
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audit.4 °5 The 1940 Act also reserved to the government the right to
deduct overcharges paid to carriers from subsequent bills.451 In
exchange for giving up the protective right to withhold payment on
its transportation bills prior to an audit in the 1940 Act, the govern-
ment acquired the protective right to deduct overcharges from
subsequent bills." 2 Congress placed no time bar on this setoff
right.4
53
The TPA amended the 1940 Act to allow the government to pay for
passenger and freight transportation in advance of completion of the
services. 5 4 Again, however, Congress protected the public fisc by
reserving to the government the right to recover any advance
payments made for services it did not receive by deduction or other
means.5 Congress intended this right to be the functional equiva-
lent of the government's prior right to withhold payment altogether
until after the carrier had provided the transportation service, just as
the right to recover overcharges in the 1940 Act replaced the
government's previous right to audit before making payment." 6
In addition, the TPA placed no time limitations on the
government's right to recover advance payments for unused servic-
es." 7 Although fully aware of the time limitations imposed by the
1958 amendments to the 1940 Act,458 only in 1982 did Congress
finally limit the government's right to administrative offset to ten
years.459 Because it is "the duty of all courts to observe the condi-
tions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury,"' 6 the
Federal Circuit observed that the contractual time limits were in
direct conflict with, and thus no bar to, the government's right to the
refunds.6
450. See Austin, 75 F.3d at 1539-40.
451. See id. (discussing 1940 Act as part of analysis of congressional intent in transportation
statutes).
452. See id. at 1540.
453. See i& In 1958, however, Congress amended the 1940 Act to include the three-year time
limitation noted above as codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3726(a)-(b). See id.
454. See id. (analyzing TPA in context of its changes to 1940 Act and legislative intent behind
those changes).
455. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 92-1026, at 2 (1972)).
456. See id. at 1540-41..
457. See id. at 1541.
458. See id. (citing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (noting general
presumption that Congress knows about existing laws relating to legislation it enacts)).
459. See id. (citing Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, § 10, 96 Stat. 1749, 1754
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(1) (1994))).
460. I& (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 758, 788 (1981)).
461. See id. The court also rejected the airlines' argument based on Missouri, Kansas & Teas
Ry. Co. v. Hartiman, 227 U.S. 657 (1913), which held that, even where a federal statute prohibits
contracts that exempt common carriers from liability for loss or damage, private parties "may
limit or qualify (such] liability by special contract, provided the limitation is just and
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Judge Bryson, in dissent, found no conflict between the ticket
contract terms and the federal statutes and regulations. 2 He
pointed out that under the majority's statutory analysis, a contractor
could not enforce any contractual limitations on the government's
right to a refund for an unused ticket, regardless of the reasonable-
ness of the limitations or the concessions that the contractor may
have made to obtain them.' Judge Bryson concluded:
The better view [of the statutes] is that when the government
purchases an airline ticket, it receives value in the form of the right
to travel to a designated place at a designated time and the right to
obtain a refund if the government does not use the ticket but
satisfies the refund provision of the contract. 
4
U
In essence, the dissent agreed with the general principle in Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harriman,41 that reasonable "contract
terms limiting the time for bringing a claim under the contract bind
the parties regardless of the more generous provisions of a general
statute of limitations."4' The dissent noted that the airlines are not
required by any principle, of law to grant refunds for unused
tickets. 7 Furthermore, the time limits imposed by the airlines were
"ample for any individual or organization with even a semblance of an
orderly accounting system to prepare and file refund claims.
The dissent concluded that the majority opinion placed a "particularly
distasteful" restriction on the freedom of contract.
469
reasonable." Id at 1542. The majority determined that Missouri, Kansas did not apply because
in that case the shipper chose to be bound by a shorter period within which to file suit for
damages in exchange for a reduced fair. See id. Here, however, the federal regulations were
.part of the parties' agreements and conflict[ed] with the airlines' unilaterally imposed time
limitations." Id
462. See id. at 1543 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing that government should be held to
contracts it makes).
463. See id. at 1544 (Bryson,J., dissenting). For example, the government's concession that
it may not recover a refund for an unused "no-refund" ticket is inconsistent internally with the
majority's analysis. See id. at 1543 (Bryson, J., dissenting). Similarly, following the majority's
rationale, the regulation requiring the government to present the unused ticket to the carrier
for a refund would appear to violate the statute. See id. at 1544 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
464. Id. at 1544 (Bryson,J., dissenting).
465. 227 U.S. 657 (1913).
466. Austin, 75 F.3d at 1544 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing that existing transportation
regulations fail to support government's position because precedent permits contracting for
shorter time periods than those established by law (citing Mitsouri, Kan., 227 U.S. at 672)).
467. See id. at 1545 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (noting that airlines may permit refunds if they
choose, but permitting some refunds under some circumstances does not create right to refunds
of unused tickets at any time).
468. Id. (Bryson,J., dissenting).
469. See id. (Bryson, J., dissenting) (concluding that majority's decision unacceptably shifts
costs of government inefficiency to airlines).
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D. Express Contractual Terms Control Extent of Review by Court of
Federal Claims
Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States47' involved a dispute regarding
the appropriate calculation of damages under a lumber contract's "no
resale" clause.47' The clause expressly stated that Hoskins, in the
absence of a resale, had to pay damages to the government based on
a set formula incorporating values derived from an appraisal
developed under a standard Forest Service method.472 On remand
from a prior appeal, the Court of Federal Claims conducted a hearing
to determine damages.47 The court found insufficient evidence to
determine how and to what extent the government was damaged, and
dismissed the government's counterclaim for damages under the "no
resale" clause.
474
In this second appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the only
question properly before the trial court on remand was whether the
government complied with the standard appraisal method identified
in the contract.47' The terms of the "no resale" clause made it clear
that Hoskins was entitled only to an appraisal "that complied in all
material respects" with the standard Forest Service method in place
at contract termination.476 The court rejected the trial court's use
of a "'fair' appraisal, an 'accurate' appraisal, a 'reasonable' appraisal,
or any manner of appraisal other than the one indicated" in the "no-
resale" clause. 47 The court held that the trial court "clearly erred"
in finding that the government had not presented sufficient testimony
to establish the appraisal's compliance with the contract terms.47
470. 89 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
471. See Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 89 F.d 816, 816 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
472. See id.
473. See i&L at 816-17 (noting that in prior appeal, Federal Circuit affirmed Court of Federal
Claims' grant of summary judgment for government on issue of Hoskin's default on contract
(citing Hoskins Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1994))). The court,
however, reversed and remanded the issue of damages to the Court of Federal Claims for
application of the contract's "no-resale" clause. See id. at 816 (instructing court to find in favor
of government in amount of $229,557.37 plus interest).
474. See id.
475. See id at 817 (observing that first appeal completely resolved questions of degree of
harm to government).
476. See id (emphasizing that contract did not entitle Hoskins to any other kind of
appraisal).
477. See id (establishing Forest Service standard as only measure of accuracy or reliability
under "no-resale" contract clause).
478. See id. (rejecting trial court's determination that cross-examination of government
wimesses undermined their testimony).
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E. Liquidated Damages Clauses Are Enforceable Unless Not Objectively
Reasonable
Liquidated damages clauses are enforceable so long as (1) the
amount fixed by the clause is reasonable in light of the amount of
loss anticipated to be caused by the breach, and (2) the harm caused
by the breach is not susceptible to accurate estimation.479 Whether
a particular liquidated damages clause is a reasonable forecast of loss
depends on whether the government, at contract formation, reason-
ably could have anticipated harm flowing from a breach of the
contract, and whether the stipulated amount was a reasonable
estimate of the anticipated harm.' The party challenging a
liquidated damages clause bears the burden of proving the clause is
unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.48'
Courts look to the circumstances at the time of contract formation,
not the time of breach, when evaluating the reasonableness of the
government's forecast of liquidated damages.4 82 As a result, courts
have enforced liquidated damages clauses when the amount awarded
was substantially greater than the actual damages suffered 43 and
when the government incurred no actual damages.48
Courts will not enforce a liquidated damages clause when the
challenging party satisfies its burden and proves that the government
could not reasonably have anticipated incurring any actual damages
from a breach of the contract.4 5 In addition, a party can satisfy its
479. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 323, § 356(1). Testimony by a government witness
asserting that the government could not estimate accurately the amount of damages usually
satisfies this second prong, and thus the issue rarely is dispositive. SeeJOHN CIBiNIC,JR. & RALPH
C. NASH, JR., ADMInSTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRAc 1058-59 (3d ed. 1995).
480. See Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 365 (1919) (discussing circumstances under
which liquidated damages are enforceable).
481. SeeJennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (enforcing
liquidated damages clause where contractor failed to prove that damages amount was not
reasonably related to government's probable loss).
482. See Sunflower Landscaping & Garden Ctr., AGBCA Nos. 87-342-1 & 87-343-1 91-3 B.C.A.
(CCH) 24,182, at 120,945 (1987) (rejecting government's liquidated damages claim because
damages amount was unreasonable at time of contract formation).
483. See Connell Rice & Sugar Co., AGBCA No. 85-483-1, 87-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 19,489, at
98,482-83 (1986) (enforcing liquidated damages provision where amount was reasonable at time
of contract formation, even though actual damages suffered were lower than liquidated
amount), rev'd on other grounds, 837 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
484. See Mit-Con, Inc., ASBCA No. 42884, 92-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 24,634, at 122,924 (1991)
(rejecting contractor's argument that government was not damaged and assessing liquidated
damages because clause was reasonable).
485. See Sunflower Garden & Landscaping Ctr., AGBCA No. 87-342-1, 91-3 B.CA (CCH)
24,182, at 120,946 (1991) (dismissing government's claim for liquidated damages because
"there [was] no evidence of any specific inconvenience"); Garden State Painting Co., ASBCANo.
22248, 78-2 B.CA. (CCH) 1 13,499, at 66,072-73 (1978) (denying government's claim to
liquidated damages where government could not reasonably have anticipated cost for delay of
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burden by proving that the stipulated damages amount is so unrea-
sonably large in relation to the government's anticipated damages as
to amount to an impermissible penalty. 6 Whether the stipulated
amount represents a penalty instead of compensation is a highly
fact-specific determination, and is the focus of much of the litigation
in this area. s7
In DJ Manufacturing Corp. v. United States,' the Federal Circuit
applied the above rules to determine whether a liquidated damages
clause was an impermissible penalty."9 The court affirmed the trial
court's enforcement of a liquidated damages clause even though the
contracting officer's declaration admitted that the amount of damages
was not calculated specifically for the contract.4' The court applied
an objective test to determine that the liquidated damages amount
was reasonable for the contract at issue because the person proposing
the rate engaged in a reasonable attempt to forecast damages, albeit
without reference to the subject contract.
491
DJ Manufacturing Corp. ("DJ") contracted to deliver combat field
packs to support troops during Operation Desert Storm.492 The
contract assessed a liquidated damages rate of 1/15 (one-fifteenth) of
1 percent of the contract price for each day an article was delivered
after the scheduled delivery date.493 DJ missed several deadlines,
and the government withheld about 8 percent of the contract price
pursuant to the liquidated damages clause.4' DJ filed suit in the
Court of Federal Claims to recover the amount withheld, claiming
that the clause amounted to an unenforceable penalty.495 The
government moved for summary judgment.49
contracted labor); Ford Constr. Co., AGBCA No. 241, 72-1 B.CA. (CCH) 9275, at 42,980-81
(1972) (refusing to award liquidated damages where government could not have reasonably
anticipated incurring damages at time of contract formation).
486. See CIBINIC, JR. & NASH, JR., supra note 479, at 1052-53.
487. See i& at 1053 ("The decision ofwhether or not an award amounts to a penalty depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.").
488. 86 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
489. SeeDJ Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1130, 1133-35 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that,
in light of federal court precedent, a liquidated damages clause is not an unenforceable
penalty).
490. See id. at 1135 (noting that contracting officer's declaration was not enough to overturn
liquidated damages clause).
491. See id at 1137 ("[The liquidated damages clause will be enforced 'if the amount
stipulated is reasonable for the particular agreement at the time it is made.'" (quoting Young
Assocs. Inc. v. United States, 471 F.2d 618, 622 (Ct. Cl. 1973))).
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In support of the government's motion, the contracting officer
submitted a declaration stating that all contracts for Desert Storm
supplies contained liquidated damages clauses for late delivery
because of the need to move war items to the troops quickly.4 7 In
response, DJ submitted an affidavit of its president asserting that the
liquidated damages rate seemed to be a standard agency rate rather
than one specifically related to the need for the contract items.9
DJ asserted that a disputed material fact existed as to whether the
contracting officer had made an attempt to forecastjust compensation
when proposing the liquidated damages amount.4l The trial court
granted the government's motion because DJ failed to carry its
burden of proof to show that the liquidated damages amount was
objectively unreasonable.' °°
The Federal Circuit affirmed, applying the rule that a party moving
for summary judgment on an issue as to which the nonmovant bears
the burden of proof may prevail merely by pointing to the absence of
evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.5°1 As the party
challenging the liquidated damages clause, DJ bore the burden of
proving the clause unenforceable.0 2 The court pointed out that
such a burden "is an exacting one, because when damages are
uncertain or hard to measure, it naturally follows that it is difficult to
conclude that a particular liquidated damages amount or rate is an
unreasonable projection of what those damages might be."508 The
court noted that damages that are likely to flow from delays in the
delivery of goods are often difficult to assess, particularly when the
goods are to be produced in the uncertain setting of wartime.'"
The court upheld the liquidated damages clause in part because the
amount of damages at contract formation was too difficult to
determine.05° This approach saved the time and expense of litigat-
497. See id.
498. See id. at 1133.
499. See id.
500. See id. (reiterating rule that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable when forecasting
exact amount of damages is difficult and amount of liquidated damages is reasonable).
501. See id. at 1135 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
502. See id. at 1134.
503. Id.
504. See id. at 1137. The trial court characterized this case as "'a paradigmatic example of
a situation where accurate estimation of the damages resulting from delays in delivery is difficult,
if not impossible.'" I& at 1133 (quoting DJ Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 357, 360
(1995), afTfd, 86 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
505. See id. at 1137.
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ing damages issues and upheld the parties' bargain that damages
would be determined by a pre-set formula.5 6
The court rejected DJ's first argument that the contracting officer's
statement about needing to get the items to the troops quickly
showed that the liquidated damages clause was designed to "spur
performance" and not for just compensation.0 7 This was not a valid
ground, the court ruled, because a liquidated damages clause is not
unenforceable simply because the promisee hopes that it will
encourage the promisor's prompt performance. 08  The court
emphasized the fact that the policy against penalties is designed to
prevent "a penal sanction that is so disproportionate to any damage
that could be anticipated that it seeks 'to enforce performance of the
main purpose of the contract by the compulsion of this very dispro-
portion. '"'509 The evidence did not show that the clause had this
purpose, and thus did not present a triable issue to avoid summary
judgment.
The court also rejected DJ's argument that a triable issue existed
because the regulations created a substantive rule of law requiring the
contracting officer specifically to tailor the liquidated damages clause
to the particular contract in advance.10 The court read the regula-
tion as providing advice and "internal guidance rather than [creating]
rights in contracting parties."51
Finally, DJ failed to carry its burden of proving the unreasonable-
ness of the liquidated damages rate on which the parties had
agreed.512 The court applied the presumption that liquidated
damages clauses generally are enforceable because of the difficulty in
assessing the injury caused by performance delays, especially in
506. See id. Liquidated damages clauses will be enforced when damages are uncertain or
difficult to measure as long as "'the amount stipulated for is not so extravagant, or dispropor-
tionate to the amount of property loss, as to show that compensation was not the object aimed
at or as to imply fraud, mistake, circumvention or oppression."' Id. (quoting Wise v. United
States, 249 U.S. 361, 365 (1919)).
507. See id.
508. See id. at 1135-36 ("[A] provision giving liquidated damages for each day's delay is an
appropriate means of inducing due performance, or of giving compensation, in case of failure
to perform.") (citing Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 486, 488 (1923)). The court
distinguished the situation where a liquidated damages clause served no compensatory function
at all because there was no possibility that the breach at issue would result in any compensable
loss. See i& (citing Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 413 (1947)).
509. I. at 1136 (quoting 5 S. WusToN, supra note 340, § 776, at 668).
510. See i&i The Code of Federal Regulations states that the "rate of liquidated damages used
must be reasonable and considered on a case-by-case basis since liquidated damages fixed
without reference to probable actual damages may be held to be a penalty, and therefore
unenforceable." 48 C.F.R. § 12.202(b) (1996).
511. DJMfg., 86 F.3d at 1136.
512. See id.
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wartime.51 In addition, the court found nothing "inherently
unreasonable" in the reduction rate of 1/15th of 1 percent per day,
which was not "so exorbitant in light of the prospective injury to the
government that it is plainly penal in nature and therefore may not
be enforced." 14 The court's decision in this case clearly illustrates
the high level of proof that a party challenging the enforceability of
a liquidated damages clause must meet just to avoid summary
judgment.
F Measuring Government-caused Delays-The Eichleay Formula
A contractor is entitled to recover unabsorbed home office
overhead expenses as calculated under the Eichleay formula when (1)
the contractor experienced government-caused performance delays,
(2) the contractor remained on "standby" status, and (3) the
contractor was unable to take on other work." 5 The Federal Circuit
issued seven decisions between 1992 and 1996 in an attempt to clarify
the proper application of the formula. 6
513. See id.
514. I at 1137-38.
515. Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 2688 (1960) (determining
overhead expenses during government-caused delay as product of daily overhead amount
multiplied by agreed length of delay). Home office overhead expenses are those costs incurred
by a contractor that, unlike overhead expenses incurred at a job site, cannot be allocated
specifically to any one contract. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1994). They are costs that are incurred by a contractor "for the benefit of the
business as a whole and which usually accrue over time." Id. at 1579 (citing Wickham
Contracting Co. v. GSA, GSBCANo. 8675,92-3 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,040, at 124,818 (1992)). The
significance is that when work on a contract is delayed or suspended, the costs cannot be
reallocated to, or "absorbed" by, other cost objectives. See id. (explaining that overhead costs,
unlike direct costs, are not attributable to any particular contract).
In contracting with the government, a company necessarily includes a portion of home office
overhead expenses, which it calculates based on the contract's duration, in its estimate of costs
to perform the contract. See Wickham Contracting Co., 12 F.3d at 1577-78. Government delay or
disruption that requires a contract to be extended reduces the contractor's stream of direct costs
against which to charge its overhead costs. See id. Unless a contractor is able to reduce its
overhead costs or take on additional work during the government-caused delay period, the
government is liable for monetary loss caused by the contractor's reduced stream of income.
See id.
516. SeeAltmayer v.Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129,1132 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (permitting subcontractor
to recover under Eichleay); Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing
Board and awarding contractor with damages pursuant to Eichleay); Wickham Contracting Co.
v. Fisher, 12 F.3d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relating that Eichleay formula is proper method
of calculating home overhead costs); Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d
1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming Board's denial of plaintiffs request for damages under
Eichleay); Daly Constr. Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520, 521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding contractor not
entitled to Eichleay formula damages); Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d
1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (articulating that courts should calculate home office overhead
expenses under Eichleay); C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.3d 669,675 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(emphasizing the element of the uncertainty engendered by delay); see also Satellite Elec. Co.
v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418, 1419-20 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming Board's denial of Eichleay
damages).
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In C.B. C. Enteprises, Inc. v. United States,517 the Federal Circuit
refused to make application of the Eichleay formula the rule for
calculating unabsorbed home overhead whenever the contract
performance period is extended."' Instead, the court emphasized
that the raison d'etre of Eichleay is some measure of uncertainty
engendered by government delay, disruption, or suspension such that
the contractor is unable to take on additional work.1
In Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso,52° the court further
illustrated the formula's proper application by declining to apply it
when the contractor's claim arose from "continuous original and
additional changes work" rather than from contract changes that
delayed performance and required the contractor to stand by idly and
suspend its work. 2 Soon thereafter, however, the court in Interstate
General Government Contractors, Inc. v. Wese 22 noted that application
of the formula does not require the contractor's work force to be idle,
but instead focuses on the delay or disruption of contract perfor-
mance for an uncertain duration during which the contractor must
remain ready to perform.
53
In Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer,524 the court finally adopted
the Eichleay formula as the exclusive means available for calculating
unabsorbed home office overhead expenses." Then, in its 1995
decision in Mech-Con Corp. v. West,526 the Federal Circuit reversed a
position it had taken just two years previously and held that when the
contractor has proved the first two prongs of the
test-Government-imposed delay and the contractor's "standby"
A contractor's entitlement to unallocated home office overhead costs resulting from
compensable delays at the hands of the government was clearly established, at least in the
construction arena, more than fifty years ago in Fred R. Comb Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. CL. 174,
183-84 (1945). The Federal Circuit rejected the government's request to do away with the
Eichleay test in Capital Electric Co. v. United States, 729 F.2d 743, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (suggesting
that decision to overrule use of Eichleay formula is best left to Congress).
517. 978 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
518. See C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
519. See id.
520. 987 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
521. SeeCommunity Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
522. 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
523. See Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. West, 12 F.3d 1053, 1057-58 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (discussing "standby" test). In a foomote, the court pointed out that sound public policy
precludes requiring the contractor's work force to be idle since this would deter the contractor
from mitigating damages, and thus would be highly inefficient. See id. at 1057 n.4 (stating that
idleness of workers is evidence of, but not prerequisite to, contractor's "standby" status).
524. 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
525. SeeWickham Contracting Co. v. West, 12 F.3d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that Eichleay formula is "exclusive means for compensating a contractor for unabsorbed
overhead" because it provides "an equitable method of compensating a contractor for
unabsorbed overhead without costing taxpayers more than they should pay").
526. 61 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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status-it has made a prima facie case that it is entitled to unabsorbed
home office overhead costs as calculated under Eichleay.127 The
burden then shifted to the Government to show that the contractor
either could have reduced its overhead or taken on additional work
during the delay period to absorb such costs.52
In another attempt to clarify the confusion that had arisen
surrounding the determination of whether a contractor is in "standby"
status, the Federal Circuit in Altmayer v. Johnsorp29 reiterated that the
appropriate focus is on the uncertainty of the contract's duration
occasioned by the government's delay or disruption.5s° The court
in Altmayer also ruled that entitlement to damages does not require
suspension of the contract, but only that it be extended for an
uncertain duration.531 The standby test therefore does not require
that the contractor's work force remain idle during the delay
period.3 2
In Altmayer v. Johnson, the GSA awarded Altmayer a contract to lease
office space.5" The contract required Altmayer to renovate the
office space prior to lease commencement and Altmayer subcontract-
ed the renovation work to Haas Construction, Inc. ("Hass"). s Haas
established a critical path schedule requiring the government to make
final carpet and wood trim selections by a certain date in order for
Haas to complete the contract on time.53" Despite Altmayer's
repeated reminders, GSA did not make its final carpet selection until
one week after the originally-scheduled completion date.536 After
completing the renovations, Altmayer submitted a certified claim to
527. See Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (shifting burden to
government of showing that contractor could have taken on more work). As recently as Daly
Construction, Inc. v. Garrett 5 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the court had taken the position that the
contractor had the burden of establishing that it was unable to take on additional work during
the delay. See id. at 522.
528. See Meeh-Con Cop., 61 F.3d at 886 ("[T]he burden then shifts to the government...
[to] show that the contractor did not suffer or should not have suffered any loss.").
529. 79 F.3d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
530. See Altmayer v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (observing that
government actions "made the length of performance period extremely uncertain").
531. See id. at 1134 (stating that such circumstances may be enough to warrant recovery
under Eichlay).
532. See id.
533. See id, at 1131.
534. See id. The contract initially called for Haas to perform the demolition work, but
change orders were issued for each subsequent phase of the renovation. See i.
535. See id.
536. See id. GSA had furnished Haas with finish schedules twice, but had quickly canceled
both of them. See id. In addition, prior to the completion date in the original contract,
Alunayer twice requested a contract extension and a price adjustment due to the government's
delay. The government finally granted a contract extension four days after the originally-
scheduled completion date, but it denied the request for a price adjustment. See id. at 1131-32.
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the contracting officer for amounts due to both Altmayer and Haas
because of the delay. 37 The contracting officer denied the claim
and Altmayer appealed to the GSBCA.5
The Board found that GSA's failure to select the carpet timely was
the sole cause of the contract's late completion, explicitly rejecting
any liability on Altmayer's part."3 9 Although the GSBCA granted
some damages-a percentage of Haas' supervisors' salaries and the
associated direct costs to compensate for home office costs-the
Board denied recovery of extended home office overhead as
calculated under Eichleay.5 °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on the second prong of the
Eichleay test-the "standby" requirement.54' The GSBCA had held
that neither Altmayer nor Haas were ever on "standby," and that Haas
had performed "additional work" which created a stream of income
against which to charge extended home office costs.54  The court
found that the Board erred as a matter of law in holding that Haas
was not on "standby," and that the Board's finding that Haas had
performed "additional work" was not supported by substantial
evidence.54
The court recited the rule that "[t]he proper standby test focuses
on the delay... of contract performance for an uncertain duration,
during which a contractor is required to remain ready to per-
form."544 Thus, "the linchpin to entitlement under Eichleay is the
uncertainty of contract duration occasioned by government delay or
disruption."5'  The court found it "beyond serious question" that
the government-caused delay made the length of the performance
537. See i. at 1132.
538. See id.
539. SeeAltmayer v. General Servs. Admin., GSBGA No. 12639,95-1 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,515,
at 137,116 (1995) ("[T]he Government's delay in giving ordering instructions held up the whole
job.").
540. See id.
541. See id. at 1134 (clarifying that workforce need not be idle for contractor to be on
standby status). The court found it "undisputed" that the government was the sole cause of the
delay in contract performance. See id. at 1133. Recent case law suggests that the source of the
government-caused delay is irrelevant to this prong of the test. See Wickham Contracting Co.
v. West, 12 F.3d 1574,1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding government-caused delay when government
ordered delays in building renovation contract while it worked on the building's structural
problems); Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors v. West, 12 F.3d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(finding government-caused delay when government failed to issue timely notice to proceed
because there had been a bid protest); Daly Constr., Inc. v. Garrett, 5 F.3d 520, 521 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (finding government-caused delay when government consumed significant amount of time
clearing up defective specifications).
542. SeeAltmayer, 79 F.3d at 1133.
543. See id. at 1134.
544. I& at 1133 (citing Interstate, 12 F.3d at 1057).
545. Id
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period "extremely uncertain."54 The government "strung Haas
along" for almost six months while never suspending the contract
fully. 47 In addition, Haas' progress payment requests to Altmayer
and the change orders to the renovation subcontract did not support
the Board's finding that Haas had performed "additional work." 48
Instead, "they simply identified the work that Haas was to perform
under those change orders."
5 49
Significantly, the court ruled that despite Haas' continued perfor-
mance of minor tasks during the delay period, the activity did not
compromise Haas' entitlement to Eichleay damages.55 The court
concluded that suspension-idling a contractor's work force-was not
a prerequisite to a finding that the contractor was on "standby,"
because the contractor's "stream of income" was still affected enough
to invoke the rationale for applying the Eichleay formula.5 The
court explained that:
Notwithstanding Haas' continuous work on minor contract items,
the fact remains that the overall project income was spread over an
additional three-month period; hence, less of that income was
allocable to home office overhead costs. Therefore, Haas' work on
minor contract items does not deprive it of recovery under the
Eichleay formula."s 2
Having met the first two prongs of the Eichleay test, Haas established
a prima fade case for entitlement to Eichleay damages. 53 At this
point the court indicated that "[tihe burden ... shifts to the
government to present rebuttal evidence or argument showing that
the contractor did not suffer or should not have suffered any loss
because it was able to either reduce its overhead or take on other
work during the delay."554 None of the evidence presented by the
government met this burden.55 Specifically, the progress payment
requests and change orders did not establish that "other work" was
performed.5 Neither the fact that Haas may have bid on other
projects "at the very end" of the contract period, nor the fact that
546. Id. at 1133-34.
547. See id. at 1134.
548. See id.
549. Id.
550. See id. (explaining that "standby test does not require that the contractor's work force
be idle").
551. See id.
552. iL (relating that Haas had satisfied standby test and that "government-imposed delay
was for an uncertain duration").
553. See id.





Haas had not reached its bonding capacity, precluded Eichleay
recovery.5 7  Thus, Haas had established its entitlement to its
extended home office overhead costs under the Eichleay formula.
Given the evolution of the Federal Circuit's view on the appropriate
application of the Eichleay formula, the next battleground would
appear to be the final prong of the test. Specifically, the court can be
expected to address the issue of what quantum of evidence the
government needs to present in order to carry its burden of showing
that the contractor could have taken on additional work.
G. Dffering Site Conditions-Contractor May Recover Only for
Conditions Existing at Time of Contracting
The Differing Site Conditions clause 558 and its predecessor, the
Changed Conditions clause55 9 have long been used in government
contracts as a means to shift the risks associated with adverse
subsurface and latent physical conditions from the contractor to the
government?5 The government allocates such risks to itself so that
a bidder is not encouraged to inflate its bid price to account for the
potential costs of unknown adverse conditions.56' The clause does
not shift the risk of all unanticipated adverse site conditions to the
government, however, but only those risks that encourage more
accurate bidding.62
Although not stated explicitly in the clause language, courts
interpreting the clause have long imposed a temporal limitation on
its applicability.5" The clause applies only to those conditions that
exist at the time the contract is executed and does not apply to
conditions that develop during contract performance.564 In addi-
557. See id.
558. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2 (1996).
559. See id.
560. See Foster Constr. C.A v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. CI. 1970). In Foster, the
Court of Claims stated the policy underlying the Differing Site Conditions clause as follows:
The purpose of the changed conditions clause is thus to take at least some of the
gamble on subsurface conditions out of bidding. Bidders need not weigh the cost and
ease of making their own borings against the risk of encountering an adverse
subsurface, and they need not consider how large a contingency should be added to
the bid to cover the risk. They will have no windfalls and no disasters. The Govern-
ment benefits from more accurate bidding, without inflation for risks which may not
eventuate. It pays for difficult subsurface work only when it is encountered and was
not indicated in the logs.
ML
561. See id.
562. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 98 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
563. See CMnMc, JR. & NASH, JR., supra note 479, at 489.
564. SeeJohn McShain, Inc. v. United States, 179 Ct. CL. 632, 638 (1967) (holding that clause
covers only a "condition existing at the time the contract was entered into and not one
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tion, the clause applies only to "physical" conditions at the work site,
but not to interference with contract performance by the government
or third-parties.'6
In Olympus Corp. v. United States,"6 the contractor argued that (1)
because the Differing Site Conditions clause does not contain an
express temporal limitation, interpreting such a limitation into the
clause "impermissibly incorporates the government's subjective intent
into the contract," and that (2) the Differing Site Conditions clause
shifts to the government the risk of all unanticipated adverse site
conditions.567  In rejecting these arguments, the Federal Circuit
pointed to the "weight of authority" that has interpreted the Differing
Site Conditions clause in an unwavering fashion as "refer[ring] to a
latent condition at the time of contracting not something discovered
later."5" In addition, the court looked to the "ordinary and com-
monly accepted meaning," of the clause from the vantage point of a
"reasonable and prudent" contractor.569 According to the court,
such a contractor is or should be familiar with the long-standing
temporal limitation on the applicability of the Differing Site Condi-
tions clause.570
Applying this law to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
government and the dismissal of Olympus' complaint for an equitable
adjustment to the contract price.Y Olympus had entered into a
fixed-price contract with the government to pave the plant yards at
the Stratford Army Engine Plant.572  The contract contained the
standard Differing Site Conditions clause set forth in 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.236-2.573 One month after receiving a Notice to Proceed from
the contracting officer, the independent government contractor that
operated the plant accidentally cut open an underground oil
occurring thereafter").
565. See CmiNIc, J & NASH, JR, supra note 479, at 494.
566. 98 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
567. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 98 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
568. Id. at 1317 (quoting John McShain, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 829, 833 (Ct. Cl.
1967)).
569. See id. at 1318 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 951 F.2d 334, 336 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
570. See id. (imposing knowledge of a "reasonable and prudent contractor" on Olympus).
571. See id. On Olympus' request for an equitable adjustment, the contracting officer
allowed a time extension, but granted only a small fraction of Olympus' request for an increase
to the contract price. After Olympus submitted a claim for additional costs, which the
contracting officer rejected, Olympus filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims
seeking to recover all of its additional costs. See id. at 1315-16.




pipe. 74 The oil contaminated the soil and prevented Olympus from
paving the yard.5" Soon thereafter, the independent contractor's
employees went on strike, and picket lines prevented Olympus
employees from gaining access to the yard for nearly two months. 76
The court held that because neither the soil contamination nor the
labor strike occurred until after the contract was executed, the delay
attributable to these events was not subject to the Differing Site
Conditions clause. 7  In addition, the court noted that the labor
strike was an action by a third party, and as such was not a "physical"
condition at the work site to which the clause applied." s
Thus, in Olympus Corp., the Federal Circuit reinforced the limita-
tions on the applicability of the Differing Site Conditions clause that
are implicit in the risk-shifting policy that the clause is meant to
effectuate.
H. Third-Party Beneficiaries & Contract Assignment
In D & H Distributing Co. v. United States,179 the court found that
a subcontractor had a third-party beneficiary relationship with the
government when the contracting officer had modified the prime
contract to make the contractor and the subcontractor joint pay-
ees.5  In addition, despite the statutory prohibition on the assign-
ment of rights in government contracts, the court found that the
contract modification at issue could be viewed as a valid assignment
of payment rights from the contractor to the subcontractor because
the contracting officer assented to the assignment.5" Under either
theory, the government's subsequent failure to make payments
according to the modified contract was a breach entitling the
subcontractor to damages.
82
The dispute in D & H arose when the contractor, Computer
Integrated Management Corp. ("CIM"), failed to pay its subcontrac-
tor, D & H Distributing Co. ("D & H"), for goods that D & H had
574. See id.
575. See i&
576. See id. (noting that picket lines blocked all plant entrances).
577. See id at 1318 (interpreting Differing Site Conditions clause to apply only to conditions
existing at time of contract formation).
578. See id. (finding clause inapplicable to conditions created by third parties). The court
did note that although goverment interference with a contractor's access to the work site may
constitute a breach of the government's duty to cooperate, only a specific contract provision can
create government liability for a third-party's actions that delay a contractor's performance;
Olympus' contract contained no such provision. See i.
579. 102 F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1996).




THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1807
supplied to the government" s  CIM contracted to supply the
government with computer hard disks, and attempted to subcontract
with D & H as the source for the disks." When D & H expressed
a reluctance to extend credit to CIM, CIM asked the government to
modify the contract so that both CIM and D & H would be designated
as payees on all payments made under the contract.5s  The con-
tracting officer issued a modification of the contract in accordance
with CIM's request.586 D & H then delivered the hard disks to the
government and billed CIM for the cost." 7 The government,
contrary to the terms of the contract modification, issued a check for
the contract price in CIM's name only and failed to indicate D & H's
joint payee status on the check."Ss Subsequently CIM filed for
bankruptcy, having made only a partial payment of its obligation to
D & H. 89
D & H filed suit against the United States in the Court of Federal
Claims seeking to recover the unpaid portion of CIM's debt to D &
H, plus interest."t D & H advanced two theories under which it
argued that the government was obligated to pay that sum: either
(1) D & H had entered an implied-in-fact contract with the govern-
ment to become a joint payee along with CIM; or (2) D & H was a
third-party beneficiary to the modified contract between the govern-
ment and CIM.59' Under either theory, D & H asserted that the
government breached its promise to make D & H ajoint payee under
the contract and that the government was liable for D & H's loss
caused by that breach.592
On appeal, the court approached the third-party beneficiary claim
as two separate questions.93 First, the court concluded that the
583. See id. at 544.
584. See id.




588. See id. at 544-45.
589. See id. at 545.
590. See id.
591. See id The Court of Federal Claims held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that D &
H failed to point to sufficient evidence to support finding an implied-in-fact contract between
D & H and the government. See id. Specifically, no evidence indicated that the contract
modification was intended to constitute the acceptance of an offer by D & H; instead, the
government simply responded to a request by CIM. See id. The court stated that the "absence
of a showing of mutuality of intent to contract between the government and D & H is fatal to
D & H's claim." Id, (citing H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
592. See id.
593. See id. at 546.
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contract modification was valid and binding on the government. 94
The contracting officer assented to the change pursuant to CIM's
request, and thus it was a bilateral modification. 595  Although
bilateral modifications are required to be signed by both the
government and the contractor, the absence of the contractor's
signature on the modification was not significant here because the
contracting officer told the contractor that its signature was not
necessary.59
The court then addressed the issue of whether D & H, as a non-
party to the contract, could enforce the contract modification against
the government.5 97 As a general principle of contract law, "a clause
providing for the promisor to pay the proceeds of the contract to a
third party is enforceable by the third party where the payment is
intended to satisfy a present or future liability of the promisee to the
third party."598 Such "creditor beneficiaries" traditionally have been
accorded full rights to sue under the original contract.599 In cases
involving joint payment agreements, courts generally view the
agreement as making the non-partyjoint payee a third-party beneficia-
ry of the contract with the right to sue the promisor for breach.' °
The court further noted that, as the purpose for the joint payment
agreement was to ensure that CIM's debt to D & H would be paid,
the case "presents a particularly clear instance in which the third party
beneficiary's interests, specifically protected by the contract, would be
impaired if the beneficiary were not accorded the right to obtain
relief against the promisor in the event of a breach.""° Thus, D &
H, as a third-party beneficiary, was entitled to recover from the
government those damages occasioned by the government's breach
of the contract modification making D & H ajoint payee."°2
The government, in turn, argued that the contract modification
should be viewed as an attempted assignment of CIM's claims under
the contract to D & H. 3  Considering the government's conten-
594. See id.
595. See id.
596. See id. Moreover, CIM "submitted a signed request for precisely the change [made by]
the modification." Id.
597. Se id.
598. Id. at 547.
599. See id.
600. See id. The court also noted that the government often invokes this same principle
when seeking to enforce a contract between private parties that included an undertaking by the
promisor to pay a debt owed to the government by the promisee. See id.
601. Id,
602. See id.
603. See id. at 546.
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don, the court observed that such an assignment is barred by the
statutory proscription against the assignment of government contract
rights and claims.' The government can waive the statutory
prohibition, however, when the contracting officer clearly assents to
the assignment.' 5 Here, the contracting officer gave clear assent to
the assignment by executing the contract modification making D &
H a joint payee. 6  D & H was therefore entitled to enforce the
assignment against the government for its failure to make payment in
accordance with the contract terms.' The court made it clear that
[a] complete or partial assignment of the right to be paid the
proceeds of the contract imposes an obligation on the promisor,
once it has received notice of the assignment, to make payments
under the contract in accordance with that assignment. The
promisor can be held liable on that obligation to the assignee if the
promisor makes payments to the assignor, rather than the assignee
in accordance with the terms of the contract.""
The government, by executing the contract modification, knew of and
assented to the assignment, and thus could be held liable for its
breach of the contract terms.' In D & H, therefore, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed and clarified the principles of third-party beneficia-
ry and contract assignment law.
IV. BREACH AND TERMINATION
A. Terminations for Default
A termination for default is a government claim.610 When a
contractor challenges a default termination, the government has the
burden to prove that the contractor was in default."' Because a
termination for default is a drastic sanction that subjects the contrac-
tor to forfeiture, courts strictly construe the surrounding government
actions. 12 Accordingly, if the contracting officer does not reason-
ably exercise his discretion to terminate for default, courts will convert
604. See id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1994); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)).
605. See i.
606. See id.
607. See id. at 548.
608. Id. at 547 (citing Produce Factors Corp. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1343, 1349 (Ct. CI.
1972)).
609. See id. at 546.
610. See Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lisbon Contractors,
Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 764-65 (Fed. Cir. 1987); ZAN. Co. v. United States, 6 Cl.
Ct. 298, 305-06 (1984).
611. See Lisbon Contractors, 828 F.2d at 764-65.
612. See DeVito v. United States, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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the default termination into a termination for the convenience of the
government.113  Furthermore, if the government carries its initial
burden of proving that the contractor defaulted, the burden then
shifts to the contractor to prove that it was not in default or that its
default status is excusable, i.e., that it arises from unforeseeable causes
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of itself, its
suppliers, or its subcontractors. 4
In DCX Inc. v. Perry,15 the Federal Circuit illustrated many of
these principles in its review of the propriety of a default termina-
tion. 616 The two most important aspects of the decision affirming
the ASBGA's upholding of the default termination concern: (1)
whether a contracting officer's failure to consider one or more factors
listed in the FAR6 17 before exercising his discretion to terminate for
default is fatal; and (2) when the operation of the Defense Priorities
and Allocation System ("DPAS") may constitute a valid excuse for a
contractor's default status. 8
DCX contracted with the government to deliver light sets for use in
medical tents. 9 The contract specified delivery of a First Article
Test Report on a date certain on pain of default termination.62 °
When DCX failed to deliver the test report on a revised date, the
contracting officer terminated the contract for default .6 2  DCX
challenged the default termination before the ASBCA, which found
that the government met its burden of proving that DCX did not
perform in a timely fashion, and that DCX failed to meet its burden
of proving that its nonperformance was excusable. 22
DCX appealed to the Federal Circuit, where it argued that the
operation of DPAS, not the negligence of DCX or its subcontractor,
caused the delay in the delivery of the test report; that the contracting
officer abused his discretion when he terminated the contract for
default; and that the Board's decision was tainted by fraud committed
by the government's attorneys.62 The court rejected DCX's De-
613. See Danvin Constr. Co. v. United States, 811 F.2d 593, 598 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Schlesinger
v. United States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. CL. 1968); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed.
CI. 358, 368 (1996).
614. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-10(b) (1996) (supplying default termination clause for
construction contracts).
615. 79 F.3d 132 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denie, 117 S. Ct. 480 (1996).
616. See DCX, Inc. v. Perry, 79 F.3d 132, 134 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 480 (1996).
617. 48 C.F.,. § 49.402-3(f).
618. See DCX, Inc., 79 F.3d at 135.
619. See id. at 133.
620. See id.
621. See id.
622. See id. at 133-34.
623. See id. at 134.
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fense Priorities and Allocation System argument based on the DPAS
regulations themselves, which "require performance of a lower priority
contract to be deferred only if 'required delivery dates [for the higher
rated contract] cannot otherwise be met.'"624 DCX argued that an
"act of the Government" excused DCX's default status pursuant to the
default clause. 6"
The court affirmed the Board's finding that DCX's failure to
perform was attributable to its own negligence and that of its
subcontractor, rather than to the operation of DPAS.626 The court
reasoned that DCX failed to prove that displacement of DCX's tests
was necessary in order to meet the required delivery date of a higher
priority contract.627 Moreover, the court noted that DCX neither
obtained a firm commitment from its subcontractor to deliver the test
report by a date certain, nor made backup arrangements with another
subcontractor in case its main subcontractor delayed or was unable to
meet DCX's time of delivery requirements.
68
The court also considered whether the contracting officer had
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in terminating the contract for
default.629 DCX alleged that the contracting officer had failed to
consider FAR default termination factors and obtain legal review of
the termination notice.6' The Federal Circuit upheld the ASBCA's
finding that the contracting officer had complied with all required
procedural regulations prior to terminating the contract.631 Further-
more, the court noted that the FAR factors that a contracting officer
must consider before terminating contracts "are not prerequisites to
a valid termination," and do not confer rights on a contractor.
632
The court added, however, that
[C]ompliance or noncompliance with section 49.402-3(f) [which
delineates the factors that contracting officers are required to
consider when determining whether to default terminate a
contract] may aid a Board of Contract Appeals or a court in
determining whether a coxitracting officer has abused his discretion
in terminating a contract for default.
63












In sum, although the Federal Circuit has ruled definitively that the
failure of a contracting officer to consider the FAR factors before
terminating a contract for default will not by itself invalidate the
termination decision, the manner in which the contracting officer
complies with FAR 49.402-3(f) will constitute evidence regarding
whether the contracting officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, or abused his or her discretion in the termination pro-
cess.&M
In F/orida Department of Insurance v. United States,6' the Federal
Circuit considered waiver of the right to terminate for default."
The court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, finding that the
threshold circumstances needed for a finding of waiver-the
government permitting a contractor to continue substantial perfor-
mance past a due date-were not present. 37 The court explained
that the purpose of the waiver doctrine "is to protect contractors who
are led to believe that time is no longer of the essence and undertake
substantial efforts after the performance date specified in the contract
has passed.""s If a non-breaching party waives a deadline, the court
held "it must set a new deadline for performance so that the parties
understand when performance is required.""3 9
The court found that the facts of the case provided no support
whatsoever for the contractor's waiver allegation.' The Postal
Service had initially contracted with Padula Construction Company to
build a postal facility, but terminated the 'contract on October 18,
1988, for default for failure to make progress.41 Padula's surety
took over the contract pursuant to its performance bond agreement
with Padula, promising to use its best efforts to complete the work in
accordance with the terms of the original contract.' The Postal
Service warned the surety that liquidated damages would begin to
accrue once the contract's completion date passed.' After several
months, the surety had advanced the project by no more than 10
percent.' The surety refused to provide the Postal Service with any
634. See id. at 135-36.
635. 81 F.d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
636. See Florida Dep't of Ins. v. United States, 81 F.3d 1093, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
637. See id at 1096 (citing DeVito v. United States, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (Ct. Cl. 1969)).




641. See id at 1095.
642. See id.
643. See id. at 1096.
644. See id.
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information regarding the status of its progress in April 1989.1
The Postal Service learned in the same month that the Treasury
Department would soon revoke the surety's authority to act as a
federal bond surety because it had failed to meet the Department's
minimum financial requirements to retain that status. 6
The Postal Service terminated the surety's right to proceed in May
1989, for failure to make progress.' 7 The surety failed to prove
waiver of the schedule.' The Postal Service did not permit a
deadline to pass and had continually reminded the surety that time
was of the essence by pointing out that liquidated damages were
continuing to accrue. 9 The court concluded that the surety "could
not reasonably have believed that time was not of the essence or that
its previous periods of delay had been excused."6 ° The court also
dismissed the surety's argument that it was improper for the Postal
Service to terminate the contract when it did for failure to make
progress.65
Florida Department of Insurance adds little to the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence regarding the waiver doctrine. Not surprisingly, the
waiver doctrine does not apply when no deadline has passed and the
government has reminded the contractor continually that time is of
the essence.
B. Terminations For Convenience-Torncello Limited
The government has broad discretion in deciding when and under
what circumstances to exercise its contractual right to terminate a
contract under the termination for convenience clause.652 One
important exception seemingly was carved out in 1982, when the
United States Court of Claims decided Torncello v. United States.653
The Navy awarded Torncello a requirements contract for pest
control that obligated the government to procure all the pest control
services it required from Torncello. 654  The Navy made the award





649. See id. at 1097.
650. Id
651. See id.
652. SeeColonial Metals v. United States, 494 F.2d 1355,1361 (Ct. C1. 1974) (findingvirtually
no limitations on Government's right to terminate for convenience).
653. 681 F.2d 756 (C. Ct. 1982).
654. See Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 758 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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submitted. 5 Subsequently, Torncello did not receive any work
under the contract for that particular service because the Navy gave
the work to the low bidder, the Navy Department of Public
Works.
In a subsequent suit for breach damages, a plurality of the court
held that neither the bad faith nor the abuse of discretion restrictions
sufficiently limited the government's right to invoke the termination
for convenience clause.67 The plurality concluded that the termina-
tion for convenience clause arose from the historically recognized
right to settle contracts when the government no longer needed the
items being purchased because of a change in the circumstances
surrounding the contract.-8 The clause was intended "to allocate
the risk of a change in the circumstances of the bargain or in the
expectations of the parties" to the contractor.69
Although the Federal Circuit seems to have endorsed the "changed
circumstances" test in one decision,6 ° other Federal Circuit panels
have limited Torncello to its facts and have concluded that Torncello
merely applies the previously existing rule"'1 that the government
may not abuse its discretion or act in bad faith when it terminates a
contract for convenience. 6 2  None of the recent cases, however,
have addressed the issue dealt with by the plurality in
Tomcello-whether such limitations on the termination for conve-




657. See id. at 764-66.
658. See id.
659. See id. at 766.
660. See Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that
the "fundamental purpose" of termination for convenience clause is "to reduce government
liability for breach of contract, by allocating to contractor a share of the risk of unexpected
change in circumstances"); cf Salsbury Indus. v. United States, 985 F.2d 1518, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (recognizing that there had been "an unanticipated change in circumstances, not merely
justifying but compelling termination of the contract").
661. See, e.g., Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Glickman, 55 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(stating that bad faith "is a prerequisite for a Torncello claim"); Salsbury Indus., 985 F.2d at 1521
(explaining that Torncello "stands for the unremarkable proposition that when the government
contracts with a party knowing full well that it will not honor the contract, it cannot avoid a
breach claim by adverting to the termination for convenience clause"); Advance Materials, Inc.
v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 480, 482-83 (1995) (interpreting Tornello to require actual
knowledge of an intent not to perform at the time of contract formation); Modern Sys. Tech.
Corp. v. United States, 24 CL Ct. 699, 704 n.5 (limiting Torn e!o to instances in which govern-
ment did not intend to honor contract when contract was made), af/'d mem., 980 F.2d 745 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
662. See Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (enunciating rule
that abuse of discretion or bad faith, which are evidenced by a specific intent to malign, are
grounds to overturn convenience termination decisions).
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Recently, the Federal Circuit again addressed and narrowly
construed Torncello in Kygoski Construction Co. v. United States.6' The
panel in Krygoski found that the changed circumstances test was
merely an application of the Kalvar bad faith test and concluded
that in Torncello the changed circumstances test had been "articulated
in dicta."'
In Krygoski, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") contracted for
the demolition of an abandoned Air Force missile site.' The
contract required removal and disposal of asbestos. 667 A Variation
in Estimated Quantities ("VEQ") clause anticipated variations in
asbestos quantity in certain areas.6 While conducting a
predemolition survey, Krygoski identified possibly significant addition-
al quantities of asbestos that were not covered by the VEQ clause.669
Corps experts estimated that removal of this additional quantity of
asbestos would increase the asbestos removal cost from 10 percent of
the total contract cost, which the parties contemplated originally, to
about 50 percent.67 Relying on an unwritten "rule of thumb," the
contracting officer considered such a price increase to be a "cardinal
change" in the contract.67 The contracting officer terminated the
contract for convenience and resolicited bids based on revised
specifications.67 Krygoski unsuccessfully bid on the new contract,
and sued in the CFC for breach of the original contract.67  The
CFC, relying on Torncello, found no change of circumstances sufficient
tojustify the termination for convenience and, alternatively, that the
government had abused its discretion under the test articulated in
Kalva 74 in terminating the contract.
675
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the CFC incorrectly
relied on dicta in the Torncello plurality decision. The Torncello
"changed circumstances" language "applies only when the Govern-
ment enters a contract with no intention of fulfilling its promis-
663. 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997).
664. See Kaivar, 543 F.2d at 1302 (requiring showing that decision to terminate for
convenience was motivated by "some specific intent to injure the plaintiff').
665. Krygoski Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
666. See id. at 1538.
667. See id.




672. See id. at 1540.
673. See id.
674. See Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct C1. 1976).
675. See /tygoski, 94 F.3d at 1540.
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es."6 76 Otherwise the case turns on the Kalvar bad faith/abuse of
discretion test. The court determined that the Competition in
Contracting Act ("CICA), 77 which compels the promulgation of
regulations and procedures to ensure full and open competition in
contracting, 78 sufficiently addressed the concerns of the Torncello
plurality regarding the Government's shopping for lower prices after
the contract award.679 CICA's competitive fairness requirement
provides the additional restraint on a contracting officer's contract
administration, under which contracting officers have no incentive to
terminate a contract for convenience except to maintain full and
open competition under CICA. °
The court found that the contracting officer did not act in bad
faith or abuse his discretion because he had a reasonable basis for
terminating the contract and conducting a competitive reprocure-
ment: the increased asbestos removal constituted a cardinal
change." Krygoski's predemolition survey found that asbestos
would need to be removed from large areas not contemplated by the
contract, and that the contract had no provision to increase the cost
of the contract to compensate for the additional work. 2
Recompetition permitted bidders to compete for a contract that
depicted more accurately and allowed for variations in the required
amount of asbestos removal.' Although the Federal Circuit denied
Krygoski's petition for an in banc rehearing on November 7,
1996,1 Krygoski filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court on February 5, 1997.'
C. Breach of Contract-Common Law Damages Must Be Foreseeable
Once a tribunal has ruled that a party has breached a contract, the
next issue is the measure of damages that the nonbreaching party is
entitled to recover."n The common law generally limits recovery in
676. Id. at 1545.
677. 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994). The authors note, however, that CICA did not purport to
change the language or meaning of the termination for convenience clause. See generally S. REP.
Nos. 98-50 and 98-297 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2174-2221.
678. See Krygoski 94 F.3d at 1542.
679. See id. at 1542-44.
680. See id. at 1543.
681. See id. at 154445.
682. See id.
683. See id.
684. See Krygoski Constr. Co. v. United States, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30308 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
7, 1996).
685. See Krygoski Constr. Co. v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997), denying cert. to 94 F.3d
1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
686. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 324, § 326 (outlining remedies for contractual breaches).
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such circumstances to an amount that would put the non-breaching
party in the position he or she would have been in had the contract
been performed, 7 including consequential damages that were
"reasonably foreseeable as a probable result of the breach when the
contract was made."M
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit ruled in Wells Fargo Bank v.
United States, 9 that the government breached its contract With Wells
Fargo by refusing to guarantee a loan that it had conditionally
promised to guarantee after Wells Fargo had met the conditions and
had performed by issuing the loan.6"u The trial court awarded Wells
Fargo over $10.5 million in lost profits, 6 1 as well as $389,000 that
Wells Fargo lost as a consequence of forgiving High Plains' indebted-
ness in return for proceeds of High Plains' public stock offering.69 2
The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling that awarded
Wells Fargo the $10.5 million in lost profits. 93 The court deter-
mined that the entire amount could only have been earned by Wells
Fargo through business transactions unrelated to the breached
contract in question, and, as such, were not foreseeable to the
government at the time of contracting.69
Although the Federal Circuit did not overrule the trial court's
factual findings as clearly erroneous, the court rejected the trial
court's finding that no intervening causal step existed between the
government's breach and the lost profit damages claimed by Wells
687. See id. § 347 cmt. a.
688. Id. § 35; see also id. § 351 cnt. c ("The party in breach is liable for the amount of any
judgment against the injured party together with his reasonable expenditures in the litigation,
if the party in breach had reason to foresee such expenditures as the probable result of his
breach at the time he made the contract."); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1010, at 79
(1964); E. FARNSWORTH CONTRACTS § 12.14 (1982).
689. 88 F.3d 1012,1022 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (defining consequential damages as what reasonable
men in the parties' shoes would have foreseen at time of contracting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1245 (1997).
690. SeeWells Fargo Bank v. United States, 88 F.3d 1012,1016-18 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1245 (1997).
691. See id. at 1018. The lost profits consisted of amounts that Wells Fargo lost as a result
of not being able to make loans because it had to charge off the amount it loaned to the
debtor. See id. This resulted in an equal reduction in Wells Fargo's capital. See id. This capital
reduction lessened the ability of Wells Fargo to make loans of up to 15 times the amount of the
charge-offamount-which constituted the approximate capital leverage ratio for the bank at that
time. See id. at 1022. According to Wells Fargo's expert, the lost income on the foregone loans
totaled approximately over $6.85 million. See id. "In addition, the risky nature of its loan to the
debtor precluded Wells Fargo from treating interest payments it received on the loan as
income." Id. This additional capital would have permitted Wells Fargo, according to its expert,
to earn over $3.65 million in interest income off of these additional loans. See id.
692. See id. at 1022.
693. See id. at 1022-23.
694. See id. at 1023-24.
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Fargo.695 Instead, the court found that the potential loans to third
parties that Wells Fargo claimed it would have undertaken absent the
loss in capital occasioned by the government's breach were "transac-
tions not directly related to the contract that was breached."6 6
Thus, interest earned on those loans was "too uncertain and remote
to be taken into consideration as a part of the damages."697 Despite
the trial court's findings to the contrary, these damages were not
foreseeable because the purpose of the guarantee was to enable Wells
Fargo to make profits on the High Plains loan, not other loans
unrelated to the transaction in issue.69 For this reason, the court
affirmed the trial court's ruling of the $389,000 that Wells Fargo
wrote off as a direct result of the failure of the government to
guarantee the loan.
69
Although the Federal Circuit continues to protect contractors when
the government breaches its obligations, contractors may be left
without an adequate remedy as a result of this decision. Because the
Federal Circuit did not take issue with the trial court's factual
findings, the court apparently applied a special rule on damages
recovered against the government. Under that rule, lost profits and
other damages that may be recovered when commercial contracts are
breached apparently may not be recovered when the government
breaches its contracts.
CONCLUSION
For the Federal Circuit, 1996 was a year of consolidation in the area
of government contract law. None of the 1996 cases individually
represents a major landmark in the development of the law. The
year's decisions, however, do reflect a notable development of trends
established in prior years.
Most important, the Federal Circuit continued its resolve not to
permit procedural or jurisdictional traps to distract the parties from
the merits of dispute resolution. Cases decided both in favor of
contractors and in favor of the government reflect a principled focus
on the substantive merits of the dispute, rather than procedural
formalities.
695. See id.
696. Id at 1022 (citing Roberts v. United States, 18 C1. Ct. 351, 358 (1989) (collecting Court
of Claims cases)).
697. 1I at 1023 (citing Ramsey v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 426 (1951)).
698. See id. at 1024.
699. See id. at 1024-25.
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The Federal Circuit also reviewed a number of GSBCA appeals,
affirming the deferential standard of review appropriate for bid
protest tribunals. Although Congress has repealed the GSBCA's
jurisdiction over such protests, these decisions will provide standards
that presumably will be applied by the Court of Federal Claims and
the federal district courts in their newly expanded protestjurisdiction.
In the areas of breach and terminations, the Federal Circuit put
contractors on notice that they will have no legal remedy for a
procedural error by the government absent a showing of prejudice.
Likewise, after the Federal Circuit revisited for the fourth time in
six years the issue of the right of the government to terminate
contracts for convenience, the impact of Torncello clearly has been
limited-although to what extent most likely will be the subject of
future litigation in the Federal Circuit.
Finally, the Federal Circuit indicated that contractors must meet
stringent standards of proof to recover lost profits under breach of
contract theories. The Winstar-related plaintiffs will have to prove that
their lost profits damages were reasonably foreseeable from the outset.
In sum, with the exception of the decision in Krygoski, 1996 was a year
of refinement in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
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